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DO CREDIT RATING ANNOUNCEMENTS MATTER? 
 
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
This study has two main objectives: First, it aims to find out how much impact different types of 
credit rating announcements have on the credit default swap (CDS) market. Second, the study 
searches for evidence of possible herding behaviour between the major credit rating agencies. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Credit rating data comprises of the investment grade level credit rating actions issued by Standard & 
Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch for U.S. companies included in S&P 500 index at the end of the 
observation period from January 1, 2000 to June 4, 2009. CDS data consist of 334, 190 spread 
observations for five-year contracts linked to companies subject to credit rating actions in the credit 
rating data set. CDS market reactions to credit rating announcements are studied by analysing 
adjusted spread changes during [-90, 90] day window around the credit rating announcements. 
Herding behaviour is studied by comparing quantities of rating announcements that closely follow 
rating actions by other agency to same direction credit quality wise across multiple time windows. 
  
RESULTS 
I find that during the whole observation period the CDS market seems to generally anticipate and 
react to negative rating announcements, whereas positive rating announcements are found in general 
less significant. Most significant CDS market response is related to negative view watchlist 
announcement. Moreover, I find CDS market reactions around rating announcements by S&P and 
Moody’s stronger than Fitch’s during the whole observation period. However, burst of the credit 
crisis has increased the significance of Fitch’s and Moody’s rating announcements simultaneously 
weakening the impact of S&P’s announcements. Considering the market impact, I find that among 
negative rating announcements, it matters more whether a downgrade is preceded by corresponding 
watchlist announcement than how many notches the credit rating actually moves. 
 
My herding study results show that among major rating agencies only every fifth rating action occur 
within [-60, 60] day window around rating action by other agency to same direction credit quality 
wise, when simultaneously rating a same company. Furthermore, my study finds no specific 
evidence of herding behaviour between S&P and Moody’s. However, there remains a slight 
possibility that Fitch would be influenced by S&P’s rating actions. Herding results concerning 
specifically agency pair Moody’s and Fitch are mixed due to small sample size. In general, I find 
that herding is an uncommon practice among the major credit rating agencies. 
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Aalto-yliopiston kauppakorkeakoulu 
Pro Gradu -tutkielma 
Timo Brandstack 
 
ONKO LUOTTOLUOKITUSILMOITUKSILLA MERKITYSTÄ? 
 
TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
Tutkielmalla on kaksi päätavoitetta: Ensimmäiseksi, tutkimus ottaa selvää kuinka paljon erityyppiset 
luottoluokitusilmoitukset vaikuttavat luottoriskinvaihtosopimus (CDS) markkinaan. Toiseksi, 
tutkimus etsii viitteitä mahdollisesta matkimiskäyttäytymisestä suurimpien luottoluokittajien välillä. 
 
LÄHDEAINEISTO JA TUTKIMUSMENETELMÄT 
Luottoluokitusilmoitusaineisto koostuu Standard & Poor’s:n, Moody’s:n, ja Fitch:n ilmoituksista 
koskien vähäriskisiä Yhdysvaltalaisia yrityksiä, jotka kuuluivat tarkkailujakson 1. tammikuuta 2000 
– 4. kesäkuuta 2009 lopussa S&P 500 indeksiin. CDS-aineisto kattaa 334 190 hintamerkintää viisi 
vuotisille CDS-sopimuksille, jotka liittyvät luottoluokitusilmoituksien kohteena oleville yrityksille. 
CDS markkinan reaktioita luottoluokitusilmoituksiin tutkitaan tarkastelemalla kontrolloituja CDS-
hintojen muutoksia [-90, 90] päivän ikkunassa ilmoituksen ympärillä. Matkimiskäyttäytymistä 
tutkitaan vertailemalla luottoluokitusilmoitusten lukumääriä, jotka seuraavat nopeasti toisen 
luottoluokittajan luottoluokitusilmoitusta saman suuntaan, toimistojen välillä eri ajanjaksoilla. 
 
TULOKSET 
Tutkielmani osoittaa, että täydellä tarkkailujaksolla CDS-markkina yleisesti ennakoi ja reagoi 
negatiivisiin luottoluokitusilmoituksiin, kun taas positiiviset ilmoitukset ovat tavallisesti 
merkitykseltään vähäisempiä. Voimakkain CDS-markkina reaktio liittyy negatiivisiin 
tarkkailulistailmoituksiin. Täydellä tarkkailujaksolla CDS-markkina reagoi S&P:n ja Moody’s:n 
luottoluokitusilmoituksiin voimakkaammin kuin Fitch:n. Luottokriisin puhjettua kuitenkin Fitch:n ja 
Moody’s:n ilmoitusten merkitys on kasvanut samalla kun S&P:n ilmoitusten merkitys on 
heikentynyt. Lisäksi tutkimustulokseni osoittavat että negatiivisten ilmoitusten joukossa on 
enemmän merkitystä sillä onko luottoluokituksen laskua edeltänyt vastaava tarkkailulistailmoitus, 
kuin että kuinka monta pykälää luottoluokitus tosiasiassa muuttuu. 
 
Tulokseni näyttävät että vain joka viides luottoluokitusilmoitus suurten luottoluokittajien kesken 
tapahtuu [-60, 60] päivän ikkunassa toisen toimiston samansuuntaisen ilmoituksen ympärillä 
toimistojen seuratessa yritystä samanaikaisesti. Lisäksi en löydä erityistä näyttöä, että S&P:n ja 
Moody’s:n välillä olisi matkimiskäyttäytymistä. Tulokseni eivät kuitenkaan pysty täysin pois 
sulkemaan mahdollisuutta, etteivätkö S&P:n luottoluokitusilmoitukset vaikuttaisi Fitch:n 
luottoluokituksiin. Tulokset Moody’s:n ja Fitch:n keskinäisestä matkimisesta eivät anna luotettavaa 
kuvaa ilmiöstä, sillä otoskoko tällä toimistoparilla jäi pieneksi. Yleisellä tasolla voin sanoa, ettei 
matkiminen luottoluokitusilmoituksissa ole vallitseva tapa suurten luottoluokittajien keskuudessa. 
 
AVAINSANAT 
 
Luottoluokitustoimisto, luottoluokitusilmoitus, CDS-markkina, matkimiskäyttäytyminen 
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1 Introduction 
 
This thesis constitutes of two distinct, but related research topics: First, the thesis analyses what kind of 
impact different types of credit rating announcements by major credit rating agencies’ have on the CDS 
spreads. The second part of the study is about possible herding behaviour between the agencies. The 
link between these two parts is that they both analyse impacts of credit rating announcements and 
describe the role of credit rating agencies in the market place.  
 
1.1 Motivation 
 
Credit rating agencies are commercial companies specialized in analysing the probabilities of default in 
the reviewed entities. In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, market participants have criticised 
credit rating agencies of a failure in their task to measure risks appropriately. Accompanied by these 
accusations many are now questioning the quasi-official role that the major credit rating agencies 
possess. This quasi-official role refers to the fact that many regulations and statues restrict regulated 
institutes from investing in lower rated debt. Furthermore, credit rating agencies’ quasi-official role 
was recently boosted by the adoption of Basel II, which is a regulatory framework set to regulate banks 
globally. Inspired by this discussion of how the role of credit rating agencies will and should evolve in 
future, I seek to uncover their role in the recent past. As major credit rating agencies, I refer to the three 
largest agencies: Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investor Service, and Fitch Ratings. 
 
This thesis is structured around two main research questions: First, how do different types of credit 
rating announcements impact the credit default swap market? Second, do rating agencies herd each 
other on their credit rating announcements? The first question aims to uncover whether the agencies 
actually add new information to the market. If they do, should credit default swap (CDS) spreads adjust 
immediately to the corresponding new risk level following the credit rating announcement. The second 
research question is set to find out whether the major credit rating agencies tend to imitate each other’s 
credit rating announcements. If the major agencies do not imitate each other, should other agencies’ 
credit rating announcements not influence agency’s credit rating behaviour. 
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Second reason to do this study, in addition to topical discussion around credit rating agencies, is that 
there has not for long existed a chance to study credit rating announcements’ impact on CDS spreads 
with a similar scale as presented in this paper. This is because the very market has existed only some 
ten years. CDS market started its rapid growth in 1998 when International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA) standardized the contract. CDS is a contract that normally provides the buyer with 
an insurance against a default by a particular company or sovereign entity. In turn, buyer pays the seller 
periodic stream of payments, which is on annual basis referred to as CDS spread. Previous studies of 
this subject have all used global data, because of otherwise insufficient sample size. This thesis, 
however, presents first market-specific findings of interplay between the major credit rating agencies 
and CDS market participants. Data for this study is collected exclusively from the U.S. market. 
 
Furthermore, this study is the first to analyse how the credit crisis has affected investors’ perceptions of 
credit rating actions. As discussed in the first paragraph of this section, credit crisis has cumulated 
some criticism against rating agencies, but before this thesis it has remained unknown how CDS market 
has actually viewed the role of credit rating agencies during the crisis. In this study, I split the samples 
of every credit rating agency’s most observations including rating action type half at the point of mid-
2007 and then compare the CDS market responses between the two periods. The reason why 
comparisons are not presented for all rating action types is simply the lack of sufficient amount of 
observations for other types of announcements. Unfortunately, insufficient sample size prevents me 
also to present same comparison for the herding study. 
 
Finally, the fourth reason to pursue this study is that there exists no previous herding study concerning 
major credit rating agencies. This is especially surprising considering the herding optimal 
circumstances around the decision making process. Shiller (1995) finds in his study that herding 
behaviour is most likely to take place in situations where “decision-making setting is complex and 
there exists restrictions of time, information and ability for decision maker”. However, there exists also 
a balancing force, which is the agencies’ own reputation. If the market would observe some agencies to 
capitalize herding-strategy it would be highly damaging for agency’s reputation leading it to lose its 
business in the long run. This study will investigate whether the reputation is so important for credit 
rating agencies that they fear to engage in herding behaviour, or are there indications of imitative 
behaviour. 
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1.2 Research framework and hypotheses 
 
In this thesis, I study the impact of credit rating announcements on CDS market and possible herding 
behaviour that may exist between the agencies. The study focuses on the three largest credit rating 
agencies that are Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s Investor Service (Moody’s) and Fitch Ratings 
(Fitch). The study presented in this paper is a classical event study examining the impact of credit 
ratings before, at, and after the announcement. The aim of this thesis is to draw a bigger picture of the 
dynamics that prevail between credit rating agencies as well as between the agencies and investor 
community. Figure 1 illustrates these studied dynamics. Note that, CDS market’s impact on credit 
rating agencies is not directly studied. However, as CDS market’s anticipation preceding credit rating 
announcements is analysed one can also indirectly infer something about CDS market’s impact on 
credit rating agencies as well. For the purposes of this study, I define that terms credit rating 
announcement and credit rating action are used synonymously and the both refer to actual downgrades 
and upgrades, and reviews for downgrade and upgrade and their cancellations. 
 
 
 
This study is a continuum for a very short line of studies that have analysed the rating announcements’ 
effect  on  CDS  market.  Until  the  writing  process  of  this  thesis,  there  were  only  two  academically  
published articles of this subject by Norden and Weber (2004) and Hull et al. (2004). Furthermore, 
there are two studies around the same subject done by a group of Bank of International Settlements’ 
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researchers referred as Micu et al. (2004) and Micu et al. (2005). These papers studied whether rating 
announcements carry any new information to markets. Results from these papers are in line with the 
findings from stock and bond market reactions: Downgrades and reviews for downgrades had their 
effect on CDS spreads while the results from upgrades and reviews for upgrades were more mixed. 
What comes to credit rating agencies’ herding studies, there is none that have come into my attention. 
Herding studies among finance seems to cluster especially around analysts’ behaviour. 
 
As stated already, this study is organized under two main research topics: One studying credit rating 
announcements’ CDS market impact, and the other studying possible herding behaviour between the 
agencies. As these main research topics are rather distinct in many respects most of the main chapters 
in this thesis are subcategorised under the headings -CDS response study- and -herding study-. The 
CDS response study follows roughly the framework presented in the Norden and Weber (2004) paper, 
but also influences from other papers are absorbed. The herding study, however, is constructed 
methodologically without any aid of previous research, but for the hypothesis building process some 
guidance was attained from the herding studies of analysts’ behaviour. 
 
1.2.1 CDS respond study 
 
In the CDS response study, I test whether rating announcements carry new information to CDS market. 
If so, CDS spread changes before announcement day should not show any statistically significant 
abnormal performance or the market could be seen anticipating the following rating action. Hence, the 
more there is anticipation in CDS market the less there is actual new information in the rating 
announcement. Furthermore, if rating announcement is true news for the market, should CDS spreads 
immediately peak after the announcement day to adjust the corresponding new risk level assuming that 
the market is efficient enough. According to this rationale, I end up with the same hypothesis that was 
tested also in Norden and Weber (2004) paper. 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Markets do not anticipate rating announcement, but react immediately as it                         
occurs. 
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If the first hypothesis holds, rating announcements truly add information to the market. However, if it 
turns out not to hold, there are three possible scenarios that may prevail as described in Figure 2: First 
the market anticipates the rating announcement, but there is no reaction when the actual rating 
announcement occurs. Second, CDS market anticipates the rating announcement, but still reacts at the 
moment of the announcement. Third, the market neither anticipates nor reacts at the time of the rating 
announcement. These scenarios may be interpreted in the following manner: In the first scenario, rating 
announcements are yesterday’s news as their information content is already reflected in the CDS 
spreads. In the second scenario, the market partially reflects the information revealed before the credit 
rating announcement, but the announcement still has its effect to the market. In the third scenario, there 
is no link between credit rating announcement and CDS market. 
 
 
 
In the CDS respond study, I also analyse the symmetry of the market reactions regarding positive and 
negative rating announcements. Previous researches by Norden and Weber (2004) and Hull et al. 
(2004) have found that the intensity of market reaction is much greater with negative rating events 
compared to positive ones. Norden and Weber (2004) suggests that the plausible reasons to explain this 
phenomenon might include information processing bias (see Dichev and Piotroski 2001), and 
disciplinary effect on firms management (see Vassalou and Xing 2003). Also an extensive list of credit 
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rating announcement effect studies on stock and bond markets has found the same phenomenon. In 
order to test the asymmetry of information content in rating announcement, I construct my second 
hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: CDS market reaction is stronger among negative rating announcements compared to 
positive ones. 
 
Until this point, my study design resembles much the work done by Norden and Weber (2004). 
However, what there is particularly interesting in my study compared to the previous is that I can 
divide my rating actions much more specifically to different rating action types with the aid of larger 
sample. Therefore I am able to construct the following hypothesis three and four to analyse more 
exhaustively how rating announcements affect the CDS market. Norden and Weber (2004) categorized 
rating actions to four different types: downgrades and upgrades, and reviews for downgrades and 
reviews for upgrades. In this study, I categorise rating announcements to 13 different types. At this 
stage it is worth mentioning that review for downgrade is synonymous to negative view watchlisting 
and review for upgrade is synonymous to positive view watchlisting.  
 
My main categorization of rating actions is based on whether the rating action moves credit rating to 
positive or negative direction. Positive rating action refers to improved credit quality, where as negative 
rating action refers to deteriorated credit quality. Furthermore, I categorize rating actions to three types 
regarding how many notches they move the credit rating on credit rating scale (see Table 3). The 
alternatives here are: singe notch, double notch, or multiple notch rating change. Finally, I categorize 
my rating actions based on whether they are preceded with corresponding watchlist announcement. 
However, this categorization only relate to single notch rating changes, because for double and multiple 
notch rating changes there are not sufficient samples. 
 
In addition to these aforementioned eight types of rating actions related to actual rating changes, I test 
the impact of negative and positive view watchlist announcements, but also what effect their 
cancellations have on the market. So far, I have described 12 different rating action types that have 
either positive or negative effect credit quality wise. There is left one more type of rating 
announcement that has no predetermined direction that being the new rating announcement, also 
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referred to as initial rating announcement. The following Table 1 summarizes the categorization of 
different rating announcement types. 
 
 
 
As already mentioned, this more specific classification of rating actions allows me to test hypotheses 
that couldn’t be tested in previous researches of the field. I assume that the more notches moved in a 
rating change the stronger the market reaction should be. I argue this, because greater distance moved 
on the credit rating scale should signify greater change in actual credit quality, which should then again 
result to stronger change in CDS spreads. Based on this rationale, I present my third hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Magnitude of CDS market reaction correlates to number of notches moved in rating 
change 
 
Further on, I assume that CDS market reaction is stronger when rating change occurs without preceding 
corresponding watchlist announcement. As the watchlisting signals that the reviewed company is under 
a process that might result to rating change the market has an opportunity to react to already that 
information, which would mean less of a revelation at the point of actual rating change from the 
watchlist. As a result of this discussion my fourth hypothesis is the following: 
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Hypothesis 4: CDS market reaction is stronger when rating change is not preceded by corresponding 
watchlist announcement. 
 
Norden and Weber (2004) didn’t subcategorize rating announcements in respect of preceding 
watchlistings. The researchers had mixed both the downgrades with and without the watchlistings. If 
this fourth hypothesis holds it would explain why they found negative watchlist announcement more 
powerful announcement compared actual downgrade. The reason is that having both types of 
downgrades mixed in the same group, the less impacting downgrades from negative view watchlist 
dilutes the compound effect of the whole group. Furthermore, there is not the same problem with 
negative view watchlistings as there are no watchlistings for watchlistings. 
 
My fifth hypothesis relates to the interesting timing of my study and it finds out the impact of the credit 
crisis, which burst at the mid-summer of 2007 when two major mortgage related hedge funds of Bear 
Sterns investment bank were found to have lost merely all of their assets. According to my 
understanding there are two major factors affecting the changing role of credit rating agencies due to 
the crisis. First, credit rating agencies’ role could be seen diminishing due to decreased investor trust 
originating from failures in predicting the default probabilities of reviewed entities. However, one 
could argue the opposite as well: The credit crisis undoubtedly has added volatility in market, which 
has made it more difficult for investors to make their own analysis of companies’ creditworthiness. 
Under these difficult times, investors could be seen relying more strongly on professional insights of 
credit quality by credit rating agencies. As there exist no reason for me to assume anything about the 
direction of the credit rating agencies’ changing role the hypothesis five is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 5: The credit crisis has not influenced the credit rating actions’ CDS market reactions. 
 
1.2.2 Herding study 
 
In the herding study part of my thesis, I study whether rating announcements by one agency impacts 
the other agencies’ credit rating behaviour. In other words, I will look for evidence whether all or some 
of the agencies imitate rating actions by others. This imitative behaviour pattern is commonly referred 
to as herding behaviour in finance. In the absence of herding behaviour, the trigger for rating 
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announcement is on the actual corporate or macroeconomic field. However, one cannot escape from the 
conception that also rating actions by other agencies would affect the decision to review credit ratings. 
 
The herding study in this thesis analyses herding rating actions, which are rating actions that follow in 
60 days rating action by other agency to same direction credit quality wise. If, for example, S&P issues 
a rating action that signals decreased credit quality for a company (downgrade, negative view 
watchlisting or cancelled positive view watchlisting) the rating actions issued during the following 60 
days by Moody’s and/or Fitch indicating also decreased credit quality are/is deemed as herding rating 
action(s). The logic is simply the following: If there are rating actions that imitate rating actions by 
other agencies, should these rating actions occur relatively short after the rating action they are to 
imitate. 
 
If the credit rating agencies would operate in a perfect world, in which they had all fully relevant 
information to make the credit rating decisions and all the agencies had perfectly competent employees 
to analyse that information, should they all issue credit rating actions simultaneously. In this case, lag 
between two rating actions couldn’t be explained by any other reason that the agency with lagging 
rating action imitates the leading one. This is because, if the credit rating agency with lagging rating 
action would have done its own credit rating review process it would have also observed the same 
event that triggered the rating action by the leading agency and then the two credit rating agencies 
would have ended up issuing their rating actions simultaneously. In this case, now that we know that 
the agency with lagging rating action couldn’t have done its own credit review process, there is left no 
other trigger for its rating action than the rating action by the leading agency. 
 
However, this is not true state of affairs in the real world, which is full of various sources of 
imperfections that make credit review processes also imperfect. Imperfect credit review process cause 
inevitably lag between agencies’ credit rating actions and thus all credit rating actions that occur 
shortly after other agency’s rating actions cannot be truly deemed as imitative ones. However, one can 
reasonably argue that two agencies still should be more likely to issue rating actions, triggered by the 
same event, on the same day than with some number of lag days between the rating actions. Otherwise, 
one could interpret those rating actions, cumulated abundantly to some lag day, being triggered by 
other agency’s rating action instead of the underlying event itself. Lag day refers to spread in days 
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between the leading and lagging rating action. Possible finding, where there would be more paired 
rating action observations with some specific spread of days between them compared to number of 
simultaneous rating action observations, where the spread equals zero, would be a strong evidence of 
herding behaviour. Based on this discussion, I state that if the following hypothesis does not hold, the 
possibility of herding behaviour according to my opinion is substantial. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Credit rating agencies issue their rating actions, triggered by the same event, on a 
same day. 
 
Furthermore, if we assume that those imperfections that cause lag between rating actions plague all 
agencies similarly, would agencies then have the same probability to issue rating action same number 
of days before or after the rating action by other agency. To illustrate the idea, let’s assume that a 
market event affecting some company’s credit quality occurs and the company is simultaneously rated 
by two agencies. Assuming that it would take the same number of days for both the agencies to run 
their credit review processes and both the agencies have observed the event at the same time, then both 
the agencies would end up issuing their rating actions simultaneously as hypothesis six predicts. 
However, there are various sources that cause imperfections to agencies credit review processes, but if 
these imperfections are random and can happen for both the agencies at the same likelihood they 
should not alter the leading or lagging probabilities for either of the agencies’ benefit or loss. This 
discussion allows me to present my seventh hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 7: Credit rating agencies have similar likelihoods to lead and lag each others 
 
In previous paragraph, I set an assumption that the credit review process would take the same number 
of days from both the example agencies, but it is obviously too bold assumption to hold in the real 
world where are also continuous imperfections in credit review processes in addition to random ones. 
Continuous imperfections slow down rating agencies’ credit review processes on continuous basis, 
which lead to the rejection of the seventh hypothesis if, within an agency pair, agencies suffer of these 
imperfections on a different scale. These continuous imperfections originate, for example, from 
employees’ skill differences or differences in information sources between agencies. These 
imperfections are the very reason for herding behaviour, as they represent the flaws that the imitating 
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agency is trying to cover by imitating the leading agency. According to this rationale, existence of 
different scales of continuous imperfections would be necessary condition for persisting herding 
behaviour patterns between agencies. Based on this discussion, I argue that there prevail three plausible 
scenarios around the seventh hypothesis (see Figure 3): First, there are no discrepancies in agencies 
continuous imperfections and thus no herding behaviour between the agencies (scenario 1). In this 
situation  the  hypothesis  seven  is  not  rejected.  Second,  there  prevail  only  differences  in  levels  of  
continuous imperfections between the agencies, but no herding behaviour (scenario 2). In this case 
hypothesis seven is violated and thus rejected. Third, there are differences in agencies’ credit review 
processes on continuous basis and also herding behaviour (scenario 3). In this case hypothesis seven is 
also rejected. Unfortunately it is impossible to say, whether the hypothesis seven is rejected because of 
situation described in the second or the third scenario. 
 
  
18
Based on the study by Clement and Tse (2005) attributes such as agency’s size, age, and frequency of 
rating actions would increase agency’s likelihood for issuing bold rating actions. As bold rating actions 
are the exact opposites of herding rating actions, I argue that the smaller, younger, and less frequent 
agency is to issue rating actions, the more likely it is to engage in herding behaviour. According to this 
rationale, Fitch that is the smallest, youngest and less frequent to issue rating actions would show the 
most indications of herding behaviour. These attributes that makes Fitch the most inclined to herding 
behaviour are demonstrated in chapters 2 and 4. This section culminates to my eight and final 
hypothesis in my thesis. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Of the three major credit rating agencies Fitch is most likely to engage in herding 
behaviour. 
 
1.3 Contribution of the study 
 
This study has four major elements of scientific contribution: First, my study is the first market specific 
study to uncover what impact credit rating actions have specifically on large U.S. companies’ CDS 
spreads. I argue that compared to previous studies done with global data, results from my study have 
better prediction power for the future. This is, because in my sample companies’ geographic location, 
corporate culture, and size do not vary. More importantly, by analysing exclusively U.S. companies 
one can be sure that the three most important credit rating agencies are U.S. headquartered: S&P, 
Moody’s and Fitch. Including also, for example Japanese companies, into the sample, but not Japanese 
credit rating agencies, would cause noise as also Japanese credit rating agencies’ credit rating actions 
would impact on CDS spreads of Japanese companies. This is just what previous studies had to do in 
order to increase their sample sizes. 
  
The second contribution relates to the ability of this study to subdivide credit rating actions more 
accurately. Previous studies have only considered negative- and positive watchlist announcements in 
addition to downgrades and upgrades. This study, however, subdivides rating actions into 13 different 
types as presented in Table 1. Previous studies have found that negative view watchlist announcements 
have more effect on CDS spreads than actual downgrades that hardly have significance at all, which 
feels intuitively surprising. This study, however, will prove that downgrades not preceded by 
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corresponding watchlisting have also market impact, while downgrades following negative view 
watchlist announcements have virtually no market effect, what so ever. The problem with previous 
studies has been to combine all downgrades into one group while the information content between 
downgrades following negative view watchlisting is much less than downgrades without watchlisting. 
Furthermore, this study is the first to compare differences in market reactions between rating actions 
that move the credit rating different number of notches.  
 
The third contribution is the unique opportunity occurred by timing of the study to present comparison 
of the CDS market responses between periods before and after the hit of the credit crisis. Albeit it is not 
clear how the credit crisis affects the role of credit rating agencies the opportunity to study it cannot be 
neglected. The line between these two periods is drawn across the mid summer of 2007 when two 
mortgage related hedge funds by Bear Stearns reported their troubles. Because of the topic nature of 
this subject there has not yet occurred any study to research the same subject. 
 
The fourth scientific contribution of my study is the whole herding study as regardless of my extensive 
efforts to find previous articles or working papers of herding behaviour between the agencies none 
were found. The reason why it is not studied may relate to inherent difficulties to study the 
phenomenon. The following section, which discusses limitations of the study, will explain in more 
detail these difficulties. Despite the obstacles, I found the idea of herding behaviour between the 
agencies so interesting, that I wanted to tackle it. 
  
1.4 Limitations of the study 
 
As discussed already, the main limitations of this study plague the herding study part. Herding, in the 
context of credit rating agencies, refers to imitation of rating actions. As already stated, herding rating 
actions are rating actions that follow in 60 days rating action by other agency to the same direction 
credit quality wise. However, whether rating action that meets the qualifications set for herding rating 
action is actually product of imitation is impossible to say. The reason why other agency lags another 
may derive also from continuous imperfections described in previous section. 
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Furthermore, there is a chance that some herding rating actions have absolutely no real link to the 
previous rating action, which they are considered to mimic. To count for this fact, one should search for 
the reason for every credit rating action and then match the causes of these rating changes to rating 
chances of each agency, which obviously is a task out of the scope of this paper. There is just an idea 
that if there exist rating actions that imitate other agencies’ rating actions, should these rating actions 
occur relatively shortly after the rating actions they are to imitate. Due to the aforementioned problem, 
there is no real means for me to say how much herding rating action observations should there amount 
for one agency in order to state with certainty that there exists herding behaviour. In other words, I am 
able to say with statistical significance whether there are unproportional amount of herding rating 
actions for one agency compared to another, but it is still unfortunately a slightly different issue than 
stating that there truly exists herding behaviour. 
 
Also my study is unable to track intra-day herding if there would exist some, because I have data only 
on business day level. This is, however, a pitfall that I am not in any extent capable to circumvent as it 
would require hourly level credit rating data that I do not have for this study. 
 
2 Background information 
 
This section is about to familiarize reader with the key concepts discussed in this thesis. The goal is to 
equip reader with sufficient background information to assist in better understanding the following of 
the thesis. First the focus will be on credit rating agencies and credit ratings. Subsequently, CDS 
contract and CDS market will be discussed in more detail. 
 
2.1 Credit rating industry 
 
Credit rating industry was born at the beginning of 20th century in the United States. Moody’s was the 
first major credit rating agency to be established in 1909. Standard & Poor’s predecessor Poor’s agency 
was formed soon after Moody’s in 1916 and Fitch followed suit in 1924. Initially credit rating agencies 
generated their revenues by selling their credit ratings to investors, but it was ultimately seen difficult 
to prevent investors from circulating these credit ratings among the investor community. In the 70’s the 
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business logic changed and the major credit rating agencies started also collect fees from rated 
companies, while still selling their credit ratings to investors. In the 70’s, also another change in credit 
rating industry took place as Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) granted the three major credit 
rating agencies (S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch) status as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organization (NRSRO). The formation of NRSRO concept further on boosted the oligopolistic nature 
of the credit rating industry as the federal and state laws regulating financial institutions holdings of 
corporate debt in terms of credit ratings so forth referred to credit ratings issued only by NRSROs. 
 
Today the major credit rating agencies solely collect their rating operations revenues from rated 
companies, which cause conflicts of interests between investors, credit rating agencies, and issuer 
firms. As issuer firms subscribe ratings from credit rating agencies they could at least theoretically link 
the size of fee to the level of credit rating or at least make the subscription contingent on what kind of 
rating they would receive. Even though these agency costs in credit rating industry are at least 
moderate problem, they don’t affect the study presented in this paper. Furthermore, the credit rating 
industry has changed from the 70’s by the amount of NRSROs approved by SEC. The following Table 
2 lists all NRSROs approved by the SEC as of September 25, 2008. Nevertheless the increased amount 
of NRSROs the industry has remained very oligopolistic as the three major agencies cover currently 
over 90% of the global credit rating market. 
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There are a few interesting facts in the list presented above: First, the NRSRO status has also been 
granted for three foreign rating agencies, but none of them is European. One possible reason for this 
might be that U.S. institutions hold in absolute terms more assets in Canada and Japan than in Europe. 
Second, interesting notion is that none of the three major credit rating agencies is actually the oldest of 
the credit rating agencies: M. Best Company was formed already in 1899, but on the contrary to the 
major agencies it only concentrates on insurance industry with its ratings, where as the major agencies 
rate broad range of business sectors. One more interesting detail is that one of the U.S. credit rating 
agency rookies, Egan-Jones Rating Company, seeks for competitive advantage by using the old school 
rating agency business model by collecting its fees from investor rather than rated agencies, which 
alleviates conflicts of interests between the parties. 
 
2.2 Major credit rating agencies today 
 
The following paragraphs describe the standing of three largest agencies and their rating operations 
today. The aim is to rank the agencies according to the size of their rating operations for the purposes 
of eighth hypothesis. Data regarding only rating operations was relatively scarce to obtain, but for all 
the agencies’ rating operations’ revenue figures were reported, which thus acts as a proxy of size in my 
study. Furthermore, assuming that price per rating would be approximately the same across the 
agencies, the revenue figures would also give a reliable picture of the relative numbers of entities rated 
by the agencies. 
 
Moody’s Investor Service is part of Moody’s Corporation. The parent company is divided into two 
business segments: Moody’s Investor Service (MIS) and Moody’s Analytics (MA). The MIS segment 
publishes credit ratings on a wide range of debt obligations and the entities that issue such obligations 
in the markets worldwide, including various corporate and governmental obligations, structured finance 
securities and commercial paper programs. MIS’s revenues in 2008 reached $1,204.7 million and the 
operating profit totalled to $537 million. Amount of corporate issuers rated by MIS at the year end 
2008 totalled to 13,000. 
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Standard & Poor’s is a brand for McGraw-Hill companies financial services division. Standard & 
Poor’s is further on divided into two subdivisions: Credit Market Services and Investment Services. 
The Credit Market Services segment provides independent global credit ratings, covering corporate and 
government entities, infrastructure projects and structured finance transactions. In 2008 revenues 
generated by S&P’s Credit Market Services reached $1,754.8 million, which makes it the biggest credit 
rating agency worldwide. 
Fitch Ratings is part of Fitch Group owned 80% by Fimalac Group. Fitch Ratings generates revenue by 
assigning ratings to issuers, new debt issues, and by monitoring previously rated fixed-income 
obligations. In 2008 Fitch ratings revenues totalled to $ 727 million and operating profit was reported 
as $ 267.6 million. These figures show that Fitch is the smallest of the agencies analysed in this thesis. 
Furthermore, Fitch Ratings is reported to rate 1,724 corporate entities, which is significantly less than 
the number of rated corporate entities by Moody’s. Unfortunately information about the number of 
corporate entities rated by S&P was not available. 
Based on the information presented above, I conclude that the Standard & Poor’s is the biggest of the 
rating agencies, Moody’s is the second biggest and Fitch is the smallest. The order is tracked by 
revenues generated by rating operations, but also other size related parameters presented above 
supports the conclusion. 
 
2.3 Credit ratings 
 
Credit ratings are views of creditworthiness issued by credit rating agencies for corporate or sovereign 
entities or specific issues of securities. Currently the global credit rating market is dominated by the 
three biggest agencies that are Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investor Service, and Fitch’s Ratings. 
Table 3 presents credit rating scales for these three major credit rating agencies. The higher is the credit 
rating the lower is the expected probability of default. 
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The above presented rating scale is divided into two main categories. The upper category is referred to 
as investment grade and the lower is speculative grade. The division between these two categories is 
quite harsh as there are many institutional investors with restrictions to hold speculative grade bonds. 
Speculative grade bonds are commonly referred to as junk bonds as well. Also covenants related to 
debt securities often link their debt service schemes or immediate callability to the threshold between 
investment and speculative grade. Investments in investment grade bonds are viewed as sound and safe, 
where as investors preferring speculative bonds are likely after for better yields. 
 
Credit ratings are usually divided into different subcategories based on the following attributes: issue- 
versus issuer-specific ratings, long- versus short-term ratings, and local versus foreign currency ratings. 
Issue-specific ratings relate to some specific issue of securities. In this category credit rating parameters 
include structure of security, collateral, degree of seniority, among the overall financial health factors 
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of issuing entity. Issuer-specific ratings refer to overall capacity of reference entity to meet its financial 
obligations. There is often strong correlation between issue- and issuer-specific ratings, but at least 
theoretically they may deviate a lot from each others. Short-term credit ratings describe the outlook for 
company during the next 12 months, whereas long-term credit ratings try to describe credit quality over 
longer term. Division between local and foreign currency credit ratings refers to considerations of 
country and currency risk. Reference entity’s ability to pay its obligations in foreign currency may be 
lower than in local currency, because of weakening exchange rates and increasing local currency 
inflation. This paper concentrates on issuer-specific, long-term, local currency credit ratings, more of 
which is discussed in chapter four. 
 
In addition to new (initial) credit ratings and credit rating changes credit rating agencies communicate 
with investors by watchlist announcements, news releases, and conversations with investors (Johnsson, 
2004). Issuing a watchlist announcement agency signals that there is an ongoing credit rating review 
process. Watchlisting can be positive, negative, or neutral one indicating likely direction of possible 
rating change. Neutral watchlistings refer to market events that likely have some impact on reference 
entity’s creditworthiness, but the direction is yet unknown. In this thesis, I will focus primary on credit 
rating changes and positive and negative watchlistings, but also evidence of new credit rating 
announcements are revealed on as nice-to-know basis. 
 
 
2.4 Credit rating process1 
 
In the following paragraphs I describe S&P’s credit rating process. As credit rating processes of all 
major agencies are very similar to each other the process description applies in broad sense for all the 
agencies. S&P’s process description was chosen to be discussed as the most credit rating actions in my 
data set are issued by S&P. 
 
The credit rating process typically initiates when issuer requests credit rating by S&P. If there is in 
S&P’s opinion adequate information on which to ground the credit rating decision the process 
                                                  
1 The information presented in this paragraph is gathered and from Standard and Poor’s General Description of the Credit 
Rating Process published on April 10, 2009 
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continues. Next, there will be formed an analytical team, which gathers public and non-public 
information for which to base their financial forecasts and models on. Historical financial performance 
data, peer group comparisons, and industry and/or macroeconomic data are considered. Analytical team 
members also meet the issuer company’s management to discuss about the key credit rating decision 
factors. 
 
The actual credit rating decision is then made by rating committee vote, not by an individual analyst. 
The committee bases its decision for the work made by analytical team. After reaching an agreement in 
the vote, the rating committee then informs the issuer firm of its credit rating decision. The issuer may 
then appeal the rating by offering S&P new meaningful information, which would affect the credit 
rating decision. After reviewing the new information the credit rating committee votes second round. 
Next, the issuer company will be notified again on rating decision after which the credit rating will be 
issued to public or in the case of confidential ratings the credit rating will be only released to the issuer. 
 
Normally, after the initial rating release S&P continuously maintains surveillance on the credit rating. 
Relevant public information is gathered and reviewed, but also periodic meetings with issuer company 
management are arranged. In these meetings management may reveal also non-public information to 
S&P’s representatives that tries to capture throughout picture of company’s creditworthiness. In 
general the surveillance process and initial rating process are very similar, with only exception that in 
surveillance process the amount of information that the company offers on continuous basis may be 
less than in the case of initial rating decision. 
 
2.5 Quasi-official role of the NRSROs 
 
Many institutional investors such as mutual funds and pension funds are restricted to invest in lower 
rated debt by NRSROs. Normally these institutions are accepted only to invest in investment grade 
rated debt. The distinction between investments grade and speculative is drawn between rating classes 
BBB- / BB+ (S&P and Fitch) and Baa3 / Ba1 (Moody’s). Micu et al. (2005) state in their article that: 
“Since 1980s market participants and regulatory authorities have increasingly made use of thresholds 
other than investment- /speculative grade, but it remains still the most significant, especially for 
defining permissible investments”. Also, many regulations and statutes restrict regulated institutions 
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from investing in lower rated debt, which is particularly the case in United States, where my data was 
collected. Furthermore, many covenants in various debt contracts are linked to issuer’s credit rating. 
For example, a downgrade under a predefined level could trigger immediate repayment of a loan or 
cause a higher coupon rate to become applied. 
 
2.6 Credit default swaps2 
 
Credit default swaps are the most commonly traded credit derivative instrument. They can also be 
called as credit swap or default swap, but in this thesis they are referred to as credit default swap or 
CDS. The idea of CDS contract is that it allows one party to transfer its credit exposure on a reference 
entity to another party by means of bilateral agreement. Reference entity is commonly a corporation or 
a sovereign entity, but ultimately it can be whatever parties involved in the contract agrees on. In this 
theses reference entities are U.S. companies included in S&P 500 index.  
 
In a CDS contract a buyer makes a series of periodical payments to a seller, where as the seller 
guarantees the buyer an insurance against credit event in a predetermined reference entity. Commonly 
credit event is a default in the reference entity, but it can also be other things as well, such as 
restructuring or bankruptcy filing. Annual periodical CDS payments are referred to as CDS spread and 
they are announced normally as basis points multiplier of nominal value of the agreement. If credit 
event takes place in the reference entity the buyer has a right to receive agreed compensation from the 
seller. Naturally, the riskier reference entity is, the wider is the CDS spread. Figure 4 describes the 
structure of CDS contract in more detail. 
                                                  
2 The information presented in this paragraph is collected mainly from Moorad Choudhry (2006)   
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CDS contract has a predetermined maturity date, but the contract can mature also in the case of credit 
event. Credit event terminates the contract and net settlement from the seller to the buyer takes place in 
one of two forms: cash settlement or physical settlement. The cash settlement obligates the seller to 
deliver the buyer either the total nominal value of the contract or nominal value less recovery value of 
some predetermined reference asset. Reference asset normally is commercial or sovereign bond issued 
by the reference entity. This procedure is efficient in all other aspects, but the problem is to determine 
right recovery or market value for the reference asset at the time of default. The second alternative is 
that the buyer physically delivers agreed reference asset to the seller in order to receive the default 
payment. This method is in practice more complicated in administrative sense, but it does not require 
difficult valuation of the reference asset at the time of default. In theory the value of protection should 
be immune to what type of settlement is written down on contract, but in practice different preferences 
of counterparties in the contract matters slightly. 
 
 
2.7 CDS market development 
 
The CDS market has grown rapidly during the last 11 years since International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA) standardized the first version of a CDS contract in 1998. Figure 5 describes CDS 
market development based on ISDA 2009 market survey. Explanation for such a high volume numbers 
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is that the market size is measured in notional terms, which is far different from the degree to which 
cash changes hands under CDS contracts. The notional market size actually describes the cash flow 
situation what would prevail if all contracts would face a credit event, and that is even under the 
financial crisis not indeed the case. Only small fraction of contracts will face the credit event and other 
mature untriggered. However, all the contracts need to honour their periodical payment schemes, but 
these are also very little compared to their notional values. Interesting in the following Figure 5 is that 
when CDS spreads started to rise in 2008 (see Figure 7) the notional amount of CDS contracts plunged. 
Perhaps the contract sellers got scared, which would have affected also to the volume of CDS market. 
 
 
The CDS market originally started as an inter-bank market to exchange credit risk without selling the 
underlying loans, but it now involves financial institutions from insurance companies to hedge funds. 
Furthermore, the maturities in CDS market have evolved: Initially maturities of CDS contract varied, 
but later the five-year contract became far the most popular one. Today also three-, seven-, and ten-year 
contracts are traded, but they lose in popularity to five-year ones. (Jakola, 2006) 
 
The fast development of CDS market has also raised some criticism for lagging legislation for the 
industry. Mainly the critics demand more transparency to the market, which is now operated on over-
the-counter basis. Also the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers’ and difficulties in AIG has taught a lesson 
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that there is counterparty risk also in CDS contracts. Suppose you have bought protection from AIG 
against default in Lehman Brothers’. The contract is very much worthless if AIG is simultaneously in 
default as Lehman Brothers’. Nevertheless, it was observed that the CDS market remained more 
functional during the heat of the credit crisis than the comparable bond markets, which merely melt 
down as investors were too scared of each other. 
 
2.8  Credit crisis 
 
This thesis provides reader with a unique insight on how the prolonged 2007 begun credit crisis has 
affected the relation of credit rating agencies and CDS market. The most devastating financial and 
economic crisis after the Great Depression 1929 hit first in the mid summer 2007 when Bear Sterns’ 
two subprime hedge funds were found to have lost merely all of their asset values. The crisis ultimately 
sent CDS spreads sky high as it is illustrated in following Figure 7 when Lehman Brothers investment 
bank filed for bankruptcy.  
 
Initially, the problem was that U.S. banks granted their customers too loosely housing loans as 
purchased property was viewed as sufficient security against default. It didn’t make the setting any 
easier that many of these mortgages were pooled and then shares of these mortgage pools were sold 
further on. There were no problems as long as property values kept on rising, but ultimately this 
development stopped and property values started to decline. Then it was revealed that these securitised 
debt obligations (CDOs) were severely misprices and many major financial institutions had to make 
substantial writedowns from their balance sheets, which led to turmoil of investor sentiment and merely 
froze, for a while, any borrowing and lending activity in the financial markets. 
  
These huge writedowns by major financial institutions relate closely to this thesis as they commonly 
were rated by major credit rating agencies analysed in this study. The writedowns by these institutions 
occurred often without corresponding downgrade well beforehand, which harmed the reputation of 
credit rating agencies. As the timing of this thesis allows me to compare CDS reactions before and after 
the hit of credit crisis I will also do it. This thesis provides a comparison of CDS market responses 
between periods before and after July 1, 2007 for rating types that contained most observations for each 
agency. 
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3 Literature review 
 
The  following  section  summarizes  relevant  previous  literature.  The  aim of  this  section  is  to  give  an  
overall view of the previous findings so that empirical results of this thesis can be better interpreted. 
Furthermore, familiarity of the previous literature is crucial to understand the hypothesis building 
process and other aspects of theoretical design described in this thesis. Main findings of rating 
announcements’ impact on different markets are discussed first with focus on previous few CDS 
market studies. Then financial herding literature is discussed with focus on analysts herding studies, 
because of the lack of previous rating agency herding studies. 
 
3.1 Rating announcements market impact 
 
3.1.1 CDS market response 
 
Previous research has studied plenty the impact of credit rating announcements on stock and bond 
markets. Only a while have academics been able to study credit rating announcements’ effects on 
derivative market as well. The applicable derivative market to study credit rating announcement effect 
is the CDS market where buyers and sellers trade reference entities’ default risk. The first academics to 
study relationship between CDS spread changes and credit rating announcements were Hull et al. 
(2004) and Norden and Weber (2004) who both published their articles in the Journal of Banking & 
Finance. Also a group of researchers working for International Bank of Settlements have studied the 
same subject twice (Micu et al, 2004; Micu et al, 2005).  
 
Hull et al. (2004) studied the effect of Moody’s credit rating announcements on CDS spreads. The CDS 
spread data in this study covered the period from October 1, 1998 to May 24, 2002 with reference 
entities worldwide and emphasis on North America. Sample included only five-year quotes and totalled 
to 29,032 spread observations. The findings were well in line with previous findings from stock and 
bond market reactions: Reviews for downgrade were found to have a significant effect on CDS spreads. 
Downgrades and negative outlooks didn’t have significant effect and positive rating actions had even 
less of an effect. This study also analysed the interplay between CDS market and rating announcements 
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the other way around: Hull et al. (2004) found that 42.6% of downgrades, 39.8% of reviews for 
downgrade and 50.9 % of negative outlooks came from the top quartile of CDS spread changes. These 
pioneering findings suggested somewhat reactive role for Moody’s agency in relation to CDS market. 
However, this study couldn’t answer in general what role credit rating agencies play in relation to CDS 
market as only Moody’s credit rating announcements were analysed. 
 
Norden and Weber published in 2004 a rather similar study as what is presented in this paper. They 
studied rating announcements’ impact on CDS spreads from all three major credit rating agencies 
(S&P, Moody’s and Fitch). The researchers analysed CDS spread observations for a maturity of five 
years from a period of 2000 to 2002. After data filtering they ended up with a sample of 60,827 CDS 
spread observations for 90 different reference entities worldwide with a geographical focus on Europe. 
First, they found that CDS market anticipated downgrades for all three agencies. Anticipation was 
observed already 90 - 60 days before the announcement day. This finding is in line with the results 
from Hull et al. (2004) discussed in the previous paragraph. Second major finding from Norden and 
Weber was that reviews for downgrade by S&P and Moody’s are associated with significant negative 
abnormal performance in the CDS market where as actual downgrades are not. However, neither did 
reviews for downgrade nor actual downgrades by Fitch have significant impact on CDS market. 
 
Micu  et  al.  (2005)  were  first  to  study  rating  announcements’  impact  on  CDS  spreads  with  a  
considerable sample size. They collected global data set covering the period from January 1, 2000 to 
March 31, 2005. The sample, in that study, consisted of 439 issuers and 2,014 rating announcements, 
which is considerably more than in previous studies of that time. Empirical results in that study 
revealed that reviews for downgrade have a significant impact on abnormal spread change (ASC), 
while downgrades didn’t convince in any reasonable significance levels. However, both the reviews 
and actual downgrades were significantly observed to be anticipated by market. On the contrary to the 
papers by Hull et al. (2004) and Norden and Weber (2004) this study revealed significant decrease in 
adjusted spread change ASC due to positive rating announcements. Furthermore, the study didn’t find 
market anticipation preceding positive rating announcements, which is not in line with the situation 
with negative rating announcements. Micu et al. studied CDS market response following rating 
announcements already in 2004. That study, however, didn’t significantly differ regarding findings 
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compared to the more recent study (Micu et al, 2005), but was run with considerably smaller sample 
size. 
3.1.2 Stock market response 
 
The potential impact of rating announcements on equity prices is more ambiguous subject and depends 
on the reason for the announcement (Goh and Ederington, 1993). On average, negative rating 
announcements should have negative effect on equity prices. This is particularly the case when 
negative rating announcements are motivated by changes in issuer’s financial prospects, such as 
earnings growth. However, negative rating events can also originate from changes in issuer’s capital 
structure when issuer’s credit quality deteriorates for the benefit of stockholders. In this case, negative 
rating effect should in fact lead to rise in equity prices. Respectively, a positive rating event caused by 
leverage decrease should lead to falling equity prices. 
 
Goh and Ederlington (1993) were first to study whether the reason for rating announcement really 
matters in equity market. The researchers did found that equity prices significantly adjust downwards 
in reaction of rating announcements stemming from deterioration in earnings prospects. Furthermore, 
the researchers found the expected positive price reaction following downgrades due to increase in 
leverage, however, the results in this category weren’t statistically significant. 
 
Other studies, that haven’t considered reasons for rating announcement, have found on average that 
negative rating actions have also negative stock price effect, where as positive rating actions do not 
carry significant stock price effect. Recent studies of this line of literature are: Dichev and Piotroski 
(2001), who find significantly negative returns during the first month after a downgrade and no 
significant reaction for upgrades. Followill and Martell (1997) with findings that revealed significantly 
negative returns at reviews for downgrade and negligible abnormal performance around actual 
downgrades. 
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3.1.3 Bond market response 
 
Studies of bond market reactions following credit rating actions are common and well researched line 
of literature. One of the first well regarded studies of this field is Katz (1974). In this study the results 
show no anticipation before rating actions and abnormal performance during 8 to 10 weeks after 
downgrades. The main difference between stock and bond market studies is that the reason for rating 
actions should not matter. However, there is one other factor in addition to plain default probability 
affecting bond yields, i.e. the general interest rate level, which is, however, easily controllable 
parameter. 
 
Interestingly, the level of rating action anticipation in bond market has increased since Katz (1974) 
study for which the data was collected from the period 1966 to 1972. Hite and Warga (1974) found in 
their study significantly negative abnormal returns during the 6 months before downgrades with a 
sample collected from 1985 - 1995. Steiner and Heinke (2001) also report significant negative 
abnormal returns starting 90 days before negative rating action with data from the period 1985 to 1996. 
 
As it was already discussed in the previous chapter that major rating agencies went through a shift in 
their business model during the 1970’s by starting to collect their revenues from rated companies 
themselves instead of investors. In the light of previous literature it would seem plausible that the shift 
would have somehow altered the relations between credit rating agencies and bond market so that 
credit rating actions would have become easier to anticipate. However, this topic is not essential 
regarding the study presented in this paper and thus it may remain still to be researched by future 
studies.  
 
3.2 Herding studies 
 
Herding among rating agencies is an unstudied topic so far, which is somewhat surprising giving the 
herding optimal circumstances under which rating agencies operate. According to Shiller (1995): 
“Herding is a natural behaviour pattern in a variety of contexts, but usually when decision-making 
setting is complex and there exists restrictions of time, information and ability for decision maker”. All 
of these parameters listed by Shiller seem to apply for the decision-making setting faced by credit 
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rating agencies: Rating review process includes analysis of various factors affecting reference entity’s 
creditworthiness making the situation complex. Consumed time in credit review process is naturally 
minimized so that credit rating change would actually offer new information to market. Also 
information sources between the agencies and the skill levels of employees vary as well. 
 
Before entering deeper into herding discussion the very concept of herding needs some clarification. 
According to various authors (Shiller, 1995; Trueman, 1994; Banjernee, 1992; Scharfstein and Stein, 
1990) herding behaviour is regarded to take place when individuals adjust their own beliefs to 
correspond more closely with the publicly expressed opinions of others. Most of financial herding 
studies focus on security analysts’ herding in their earnings forecasts. Other areas that herding studies 
usually covers are bank runs and mutual fund herding. However, for the purposes of this study, 
analysts’ herding studies offer the most applicable theoretical background. The following two 
paragraphs present two previous analysts’ herding studies that are essential regarding the study 
presented in this paper. 
  
A relatively early study by Trueman (1994) reports herding findings among security analysts. The 
author examines earnings forecasts behaviour by analysts and finds that analysts are inclined to release 
earnings forecasts close to prior expectations even if their private information would justify more 
extreme forecasts. Furthermore, prior forecasts by other analysts were found to affect analyst’s own 
forecast, which is the very evidence of herding behaviour. Even if there are some fundamental 
differences between security analysts’ and rating agencies’ decision making setting it is very tempting 
to figure that there would also be some similarities that would cause herding behaviour between credit 
rating agencies as well. Main difference between security analysts’ and credit rating agencies’ decision 
making setting is that security analysts normally prepare their forecasts individually, where as rating 
agencies conclude their rating actions in groups of analysts referred to as rating committees. In group 
level herding behaviour may be less severe problem as insecure group members that would otherwise 
engage in herding behaviour may not participate that much to decision-making process as those that 
have their strong own insights. The sixth and seventh hypotheses presented in the introductory of this 
thesis focus on finding indications of herding behaviour between the credit rating agencies. 
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More recent study by Clement and Tse (2005) studied what characteristics drive analysts to issue bold 
earnings forecasts. Bold forecast refer to a forecasts, which move farther away from the consensus 
forecast. On the contrary, forecasts that move closer to consensus forecast are referred to as herding 
forecasts in that study. They found that attributes such as general experience, prior accuracy, brokerage 
size and forecast frequency are positively correlated with likelihood to issue bold forecasts. Even 
though the researchers didn’t directly investigate what parameters cause herding forecasts to be issued, 
it seems logical to conclude that opposites of parameters causing bold forecasts must correlate with 
frequency of herding forecasts. Thus lack of general experience, lack of prior accuracy, inverse of 
brokerage size, and inverse of forecast frequency would induce relatively more herding forecasts to be 
issued. These findings of parameters that are viewed to cause bold and herding forecasts are the 
theoretical base for my eighth hypothesis presented in the introductory. 
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4 Description of the data sets 
 
The following section provides a detailed description of the data analysed in this thesis. First data for 
the CDS respond study will be described and then data for the herding study. There are two important 
issues to be clarified before entering to the detailed data description: First, the CDS respond study 
requires data from both credit rating announcements and CDS spreads, whereas the herding study is 
build solely around data of credit rating announcements. Second, the initial credit rating data set for 
both CDS respond study and herding study is the same, but for two reasons the final samples differ 
from each other: First, credit rating announcements for CDS respond study has to relate to companies 
subject to five year CDS contracts. Second, for the herding study, only credit rating announcements 
concerning companies rated in minimum by two of the major agencies simultaneously are to be 
included. 
 
4.1 CDS market respond study 
 
The data consist of U.S. companies’ CDS transaction spreads for five-year contracts and corresponding 
issuer-specific credit rating data. The sample contains only data related to companies that are included 
in S&P 500 index at June 4, 2009. Furthermore, only the credit rating data above the investment grade 
threshold (see Table 3) is considered in this study. The data for both the CDS spreads and rating actions 
were retrieved from Bloomberg database and they cover the same period from January 1, 2000 to June 
4, 2009.  Number of companies included in this study amounts to 160 and the names are listed in 
Appendix 1. 
 
4.1.1 CDS spread data 
 
The initial CDS data set covers all U.S. companies that had CDS transaction spreads for the maturity of 
five years during the observation period. Number of these reference entities totals to 354. Maturity of 
five years is currently the most popular for CDS contracts, which makes them the most liquid ones and 
that is the reason why they are studied in this paper. Due to some illiquidity still existing in the market 
there aren’t CDS transactions for every reference entity every day in my sample, which is why I need 
to use the most recent transaction spread available as a proxy for the missing day’s one. The same 
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technique was used in Micu et al. (2005) paper, where as Norden and Weber (2004) and Hull et al. 
(2004) linearly interpolated the missing days’ quotes. This interpolation technique was necessary at the 
time of their researches as their sample consisted of less CDS trade activity, which would have 
otherwise led to misleading results. 
 
Next, I narrow down the number of companies in the CDS respond sample to only those that were 
included in S&P 500 index at June 4, 2009 and had investment grade level credit rating activity by at 
least one of the studied rating agencies (S&P, Moody’s, Fitch) during the observation period. Thus, the 
number of reference entities in the sample declines to 160. I decided to include only investment grade 
level rating actions concerning companies in S&P 500 index to the sample due to the fact that small 
companies with poor credit quality are rarely linked to CDS contracts. The total number of CDS spread 
observations in my final sample equals to 334,190, which is considerably more than in the earlier 
studies published in academic journals in the field (Norden and Weber, 2004; Hull et al, 2004). 
 
4.1.2 Descriptive statistics I 
 
Figure 6 describes the sample size development across the observation period in respect to number of 
companies included in the sample. Such a considerable leap in sample size during the years 2002 - 
2004 is explained by the fact that then occurred most of the first rating actions for the companies in my 
sample. The sample size growth in Figure 6 has only little to do with the overall growth in the CDS 
market described Figure 5. The fact that number of companies in the sample does not decline in any 
point of time during the observation period is because of only those companies are included in the 
sample that existed at the end of the data period. This data collection method causes some survivorship 
bias into my sample, which is discussed better in the limitations of the data section. 
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Figure 7 describes average CDS spread development in my sample. Due to possible statistical problems 
caused by a small sample size, years before 2004 are omitted from this illustration. As it is easily 
observed from the figure, the overall credit quality of U.S. companies remained very steady during the 
period 2004 - mid-2007. Bear Stearns mortgage related hedge fund difficulties initiated the credit crisis 
in the summer of 2007, after which the CDS spreads slowly became more volatile and kept on 
elevating. However, the CDS spreads didn’t skyrocket until the chapter 11 bankruptcy filing of Lehman 
Brothers on September 15, 2008. This event caused a sharp peak in the CDS spreads market wide, 
which can also be perceived in the Figure 7. 
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4.1.3 Credit rating data 
 
The credit rating sample, used in my CDS reactions study, consists only of ratings that reflect issuer’s 
creditworthiness (issuer-specific ratings). This is to avoid problems with multiple subsequent rating 
actions that would all respond to the same the underlying cause. This would be a problem if a company 
had many issues rated by same agency. Furthermore, the link between issuer-specific ratings and CDS 
spread changes is much stronger than issue-specific ratings and the CDS spread changes. This is 
because CDS spread changes are function of reference entity’s probability to run in default and issue-
specific ratings take into account also other aspects, such as credit quality of possible guarantors, 
insurers. 
 
Rating types included in my study are the following: S&P: LT local issuer Credit, Moody’s: Issuer 
rating, Fitch: LT Issuer Default Rating. Unlike Norden and Weber (2004), I am able to construct my 
credit rating sample without having to include multiple rating types from the agencies. Unfortunately, 
this strict sample policy leads to the result that number of Moody’s observations does not reach as high 
as other agencies’. Still my credit rating sample contains more than double the observations than that of 
Norden and Weber’s (2004) equalling to 861 observations in total. 
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4.1.4 Descriptive statistics II 
 
My credit rating sample of 861 observations contains 37.79 % positive rating actions, while the rest 
62.21 % are negative ones when omitting new rating actions. Table 1 in the introduction section 
explains the expected market reaction, i.e. which of the rating actions are perceived as positive and 
which negative ones. The domination of negative rating events suggests deteriorated overall level of 
credit quality, which is well in line with the average CDS spread development described in the Figure 
7. The detailed breakdown of credit rating sample is presented in Table 4. Note that the final credit 
rating sample for CDS reactions study differs from the final credit rating sample for the herding study 
in respects explained at the beginning of this chapter. 
 
Table 4 is interesting reading as it explains how the three major credit rating agencies actually 
communicate with the market. It seems that Moody’s uses the most negative watchlistings as 75% of 
its every single notch downgrades were preceded by a corresponding watchlist announcement. 
Respectively, S&P issued approximately half of its single notch downgrades from the watchlist and 
half without the previous watchlisting. Fitch used the least negative watchlistings as over 90% of its 
single notch downgrades occurred without preceding watchlisting. The role of positive view watchlist 
announcements seems less important than negative ones. Fitch made almost all of its single notch 
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upgrades without preceding watchlisting. Also S&P seems to upgrade easily without corresponding 
wacthlisting as approximately 71% of its single notch upgrades took place without preceding positive 
watchlisting. Moody’s, however, issued preceding positive view watchlisting for 60% of its single 
notch upgrades. On the other hand, when positive watchlisting was issued it seems to have led for 
upgrade quite often as during the total observation period only six positive view watchlistings were 
cancelled. Negative watchlistings, however, were cancelled much more often. Furthermore, it is 
interesting that in Table 4 almost all new credit rating announcements during the observation period 
were issued by Fitch. This finding might indicate improved investor perception for Fitch’s agency. 
 
4.2 Herding study 
 
4.2.1 Data 
 
The original credit rating data in my herding study is the very same as used in the CDS market reaction 
study: The data consist of issuer-specific investment grade level credit rating actions from the period 
January 1, 2000 to June 4, 2000 by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch for U.S. companies included in S&P 500 
index at the end of the observation period. However, from this original sample, only rating actions 
relating to companies simultaneously rated by at least two major rating agencies could be included to 
the final sample. Companies with simultaneous rating activity by the major rating agencies are as 
follows: 110 companies simultaneously rated by S&P and Moody’s, 219 companies rated 
simultaneously by S&P and Fitch, and 85 companies rated simultaneously by Moody’s and Fitch. Lists 
of these sample companies rated simultaneously at least by two major rating agencies are shown in 
Appendix 2. 
 
The reason, why I use the same original credit rating sample for both the herding study and the CDS 
reactions study, is that the companies included in S&P 500 index are the largest in the U.S. market and 
thus most inclined to have more than just one rating agency to rate them. Also companies in S&P 500 
index are of the highest end regarding their credit quality, which would have made the decision to 
include also below investment grade level rating activity into my sample rather trivial. Furthermore, the 
decision to analyse only issuer-specific ratings is made to avoid problems with multiple subsequent 
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rating actions triggered by the same underlying event if companies had many issues rated 
simultaneously. 
 
In the CDS reactions study I analyse individually 13 different rating announcement types, which are 
divided into six types that have negative expected spread reaction, six types that have positive expected 
spread reaction, and the new rating announcement having undetermined spread reaction. In the herding 
study I am only concerned about the direction of rating action, in addition to its timing. That is why I 
merge all the positive rating actions into one category and all the negative actions into one category as 
well and exclude new rating announcements with undetermined market reaction from the analysis. In 
my herding study, sample of negative rating actions equals to 1,468 and number of positive actions 
equals to 786, which together count to 2,254 rating actions in total. Negative announcements refer to 
situations where agency signals decreased creditworthiness that would cause CDS spreads to increase. 
Vice versa, positive rating announcements refer to situations where agency signals strengthened 
creditworthiness that would cause CDS spreads to decrease. 
 
4.2.2 Descriptive statistics III 
 
The following Table 5 shows a description of my herding study sample. Panel A shows that the sample 
consists of total 2,254 rating actions of which 65.13% are negative rating actions while the rest 34.87% 
are positive ones. The proportion of negative rating actions slightly exceeds the proportion in the credit 
rating sample for the CDS reactions study, which is line with the aforementioned fact that CDS 
contracts usually relate to companies with good credit quality. Interestingly S&P and Fitch have almost 
the identical proportion of negative and positive announcements, while Moody’s seems to have issued 
slightly more positive rating actions compared to the other two agencies during the observation period. 
This finding likely relates to the fact that number of companies, which are rated by Moody’s, in my 
herding study sample, is significantly less compared to companies rated by the other two agencies.  
 
Panel B plots the herding rating action observations in my sample. Out of the total 2,254 rating actions 
432 meets the qualifications set for herding rating action. In previous herding literature, that being 
mainly written for security analysts’ earnings forecasts, herding forecast refers to one that moves closer 
to consensus estimate. However, in my study framework where only three players are analysed, the 
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consensus logic does not work. I define, that herding rating action refers to rating action, which follows 
in 60 days previous rating action issued by other agency into the same direction credit quality wise. The 
logic is to match two different rating actions together and study whether these herding rating actions 
unproportionally amount to one agency or whether there exists some timely patterns when these 
herding rating actions are issued. Note that my herding rating action definition has only two restrictions 
concerning the timing and the direction of the rating action and that is the reason why I pool all positive 
and all negative rating actions together in their own groups. For agency level herding action 
information Table 5 is structured so that agencies indicated on the columns refer to issuers of herding 
rating actions, while agencies on rows refer to agencies that those herding rating actions are supposed 
to imitate. 
 
Panel C in Table 5 plots the theoretical maximums of herding actions. These actions are rating actions 
by other agency to which agency have had a chance to respond. Agencies indicated on columns in the 
table refer to ones who either issued herding rating action or could have done it as a response to rating 
actions by agency indicated on the row. Note that total number of theoretical maximums of herding 
rating actions amounts more than total number of all rating actions in the sample. This is because the 
sample includes also companies that are simultaneously rated by all three agencies, which leads to fact 
that one rating action can be viewed as triggering rating actions for herding rating actions by the two 
other agencies simultaneously. The panel D plots percentage figures, which indicate what proportion of 
every rating action that in theory could have triggered a herding rating action, actually triggered one. 
These figures are all very close to each other between the range from 12.96% to 18.84%. Agency 
indicated on column refers to issuer of herding rating action and agency on row refers to one that those 
herding rating actions are to imitate.  
 
The Panel E describes the ratios between two agencies theoretical maximums for herding rating 
actions. I name this ratio as “lazy ratio” because it describes how many times more (or less) an agency 
has issued rating actions for which other agency could have responded by issuing a herding rating 
action during the observation period. Consider, for example Fitch’s lazy ratio with S&P. S&P has 
issued in total 811 rating actions that could have triggered a herding action by Fitch, while Fitch only 
issued 532 actions for which S&P was able to react. Thus the Fitch’s lazy ratio with S&P equals to 
532/811=0.66, which describes the relative frequency of Fitch’s rating announcements to S&P’s rating 
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action behaviour. The use of lazy ratio, as a control variable for rating action activity, is discussed more 
in methodology section. Note that lazy ratios in the top right hand corner and bottom left hand corner 
are inverse figures to each others. According to the information revealed by lazy ratios S&P and 
Moody’s are approximately equally active to issue rating actions while Fitch seems to issue 
approximately 1/3 less rating actions than S&P and Moody’s. A likely reason for Fitch’s lesser credit 
rating activity is its tendency to prefer straight upgrades and downgrades, where as S&P and Moody’s 
tend to issue watchlistings before actual rating changes (see Table 4).  
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4.3 Limitations of the data 
 
I collected CDS spread data for companies that were reference entities to CDS contracts at June 4, 
2009. This particular data mining method causes some survivorship bias to my CDS market reactions 
sample. Survivorship bias refers to automatic exclusion of companies that no longer exist at the end of 
period. In study framework, the survivor bias causes my sample to exclude companies that went 
bankrupt, merged with some other company, or some other ways ceased to exist during the observation 
period. However, the magnitude of this bias remains low as I only have data of companies with 
investment grade level credit rating, which means that the companies in my sample are least likely of 
all companies to go bankrupt. 
 
Furthermore, for CDS respond study, I accept observations of credit rating announcements from the 
very beginning until the very end of the total observation period. This causes some censoring bias to 
my CDS respond sample, because for those rating actions that have occurred during the first and last 90 
days in my observation period, I cannot have full [-90, 90] days CDS data to study. However, 
considering the very wide total observation period, the effect of this bias is well diluted. 
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5 Methodology 
 
This section explains how the data described in previous sections are processed and tested for the 
hypotheses. The methodology described in CDS market reaction study is in line with methodological 
frameworks in previous studies, but the one described in the herding study is invented by the author for 
the purposes of this study. 
5.1 CDS market respond study 
 
The methodology in CDS market reaction study follows in most respects the one presented in Norden 
and Weber (2004) paper. The researchers studied also S&P’s, Moody’s and Fitch’s rating 
announcements’ effects on CDS market. Norden and Weber (2004) studied whether rating 
announcements causes adjusted CDS spread changes (ASCs) deviate from zero with statistical 
significance. This section starts by explaining how I process my data to have a sample of ASC 
observations. Then the focus turns to the applicable statistical tests to uncover the statistical 
significance behind the findings.   
 
5.1.1 Determining adjusted spread changes (ASCs) 
 
In the data processing, my first phase is to link rating actions of the studied agencies with the 
corresponding CDS spread data. The day, on which rating action is issued, is now on referred as day 
zero. I take both 90 days of CDS spread data before day zero and 90 days after it in order to capture the 
impact of rating action. Hull et al. (2004) and Norden and Weber (2004) both used the 90 days 
observation window before and after the day zero. Micu et al. (2005), however, applied only [-60, 60] 
window. To be able to better compare my results with the previous studies, I choose to use the wider 
event window. 
 
Next, I adjust the CDS spreads against effects of market wide events. A proper example of market wide 
event would be the collapse of Lehman Brothers, which caused a sharp peak in CDS spreads on 
September 19, 2009 (see Figure 7). If not adjusted, all the CDS spread observations close to that event 
would be contaminated, as the purpose is to exclusively study the effects of rating actions. The 
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adjustment is done by constructing an index that reflects the performance of average credit quality and 
then adjusting changes in CDS spreads with changes in the index. The index that I use is the average of 
all CDS spread observations across the observation period. In fact, my index is the very same what is 
illustrated in Figure 6. Next, I calculate the ASCs applying the following formula: 
 
Equation (1):       ASC(i,j) = CDS(i)-CDS(j)-[I(i)-I(j)] 
 
The formula states that adjusted spread change for the period from i to j [ASC(i,j)] equals the 
difference in CDS spreads between the beginning and the end of that period [CDS(i) - CDS(j)] 
subtracted with a corresponding difference in the index [I(i) - I(j)] . For the purposes of better graphical 
illustration of results I also determine cumulative abnormal spread change development across event 
windows. The cumulative adjusted spread change (CASC) is defined as a sum of all preceding ASCs in 
the event window: 
 
Equation (2):       CASC(i) = ASC(1) + ASC(2) + … + ASC(i) 
 
This sample processing technique is the very same as presented in Norden and Weber (2004) study 
with two exceptions: First, they eliminated rating actions from their sample that were preceded with 
similar rating action 90 days earlier. This was to avoid CDS spread data contamination caused by 
multiple events in the time window. Second, Norden and Weber (2004) constructed own indexes for 
every  rating  class  and  adjusted  the  spread  changes  with  the  CDS  spread  index  that  matched  the  
contemporary rating of the company.  I choose not to follow Norden and Weber (2004) study in these 
respects for the following reasons: 
 
First, I do not eliminate rating actions that occurs close to each other as I have a credit rating sample 
twice as large compared to Norden and Weber (2004), and because in larger samples random 
occurrences even out better each other. Furthermore, according to my opinion, the exclusion of 
consequent similar events would give too strong impression of rating actions influence. For example, if 
Fitch would emit 100 negative view watchlist announcements under a hypothetical observation period 
and 50 of them would occur soon after respective announcements by S&P and Moody’s, it would be 
reasonable to expect a weak announcement effect for these negative view announcements. However, 
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the rest 50 negative view announcements would by the same logic carry a stronger market impact as 
investors in these cases were not warned by other agencies beforehand. Now, concentrating only to 
announcements, which are not preceded with a similar announcement, would naturally give too strong 
image of agency’s role in market as it is totally up to the very agency if it responds more slowly than 
other agencies.  
  
Second, I do not construct own indexes for every credit rating class because I have more homogeneous 
sample than Norden and Weber (2004). First, my sample has only U.S. companies included, which 
suggests geographical homogeneity. Second, my sample companies do not differ much from each other 
regarding their size as they are all relatively big, because of the restriction that they need to be included 
in S&P 500 index. Third, and most importantly, my sample companies have all investment grade credit 
quality status, which suggests homogeneity in credit quality wise. 
 
5.1.2 Applied statistical tests 
 
Student’s t-test 
 
The most popular test to measure impact of credit rating announcement on CDS market in the previous 
literature has been student’s t-test. Likewise in previous studies, I use the t-test to find out on which 
significance level average of ASC observations deviates from zero. If rating announcement carries no 
impact  on  market,  average  ASC  should  not  significantly  deviate  from  zero.  But,  if  the  rating  
announcement has its impact, then the mean ASC should be either bigger or smaller than zero 
depending on what expected market reaction is attached to rating announcement. This rationale also 
suggests me two use 1-tailed test, as the direction to which the mean should deviate is known. 
Moreover, Micu et al. (2005) also used particularly 1-tailed test in their study. A minor problem with t-
test is that it implicitly assumes that sample observations are normally distributed around their mean. 
The following equation (3) describes how the test parameter is determined. 
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Sign test 
 
The sign test escapes from the problem around assumptions on residuals’ distribution as it only regards 
them positive or negative ones. The idea of the sign test is simply to measure on which significance 
level proportion of positive or negative observations deviates from half of total observations. In my 
setting, the test measures whether adjusted spread changes, on a given time interval, are significantly 
more positive or more negative ones. The test parameter, which is normally distributed, is determined 
by the following equation (4): 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Herding study 
 
Due to the lack of applicable previous research, methodology presented in this section is invented 
solely by the author. The basic idea is to pair match rating actions of different agencies that have 
moved into the same direction credit quality wise and have occurred within a 60 day time window. The 
latter of these matched actions is defined as herding rating action. The logic is simple: If there are 
rating actions that imitate previously issued rating actions should these actions occur relatively soon 
after the rating action they are supposed to imitate. As I have already stated previously, in perfect 
world, rating actions by different agencies for same companies should occur simultaneously as there 
would exist no reason why they wouldn’t. However, in real world, I assume that there are three factors 
affecting the length of lag between rating actions: 
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1) Continuous imperfections 
2) Random imperfections 
3) Herding behaviour 
 
The continuous imperfections refer to factors such as availability of relevant data on a continuous basis 
for credit review process and professionalism of employees running the process. Credit rating agencies 
base their credit review process on public information released to market, but also on private 
information gathered in meetings with company executives. Especially, in these meetings with 
company representatives’ there might be serious differences between agencies on what kind of 
information they receive on a continuous basis. Furthermore, continuous imperfections refer to quality 
of mind power running the review process. Some agencies might just have employees superior to 
employees of other agencies in respect to how accurately and fast they can run the credit review 
process. One more factor to cause continuous imperfections is the credit review process required in 
agencies, before issuing credit rating actions. It might be very plausible that in some agencies 
information needs to be processed more throughout than in other agencies, which cause naturally lag 
between credit rating actions. As a conclusion of this discussion I state that differences in data 
availability on continuous basis, mind power of employees, and requirement standards in credit rating 
review  process  between  the  credit  rating  agencies  result  in  differences  in  reaction  times  to  market  
events. 
 
Random imperfections refer to small differences, in for example in data availability or human errors 
that cause lag either to increase or decrease, but with the same likelihood to both directions. As sample 
size increases these random imperfections are supposed to cancel out each other on average level. 
Assuming that there would not exist continuous imperfections, described in previous paragraph, these 
random imperfections would lead agency’s credit rating action probability function, centred on the 
event of other agency’s credit rating action, to resemble a normal distribution function. Furthermore, if 
there wouldn’t exist continuous imperfections the likelihood for credit rating action occurring some 
number of days before or after the credit rating action of other agency should be equal. 
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Herding behaviour affects length of lag as well, but it affects to the opposite direction than continuous 
imperfections as the whole logic of herding behaviour is to cover own flaws (i.e. continuous 
imperfections) by imitating actions of others. According to this rationale the findings that would show 
unproportional number of credit rating events taking place relatively shortly after other agency’s credit 
rating action would indicate herding behaviour. However, it is impossible still to say with certainty 
whether the findings are still only due to continuous imperfections or is there actual herding behaviour 
in place. Note that I have assumed that herding only speeds up the credit review process of the herding 
agency. In the real world there may also be other ways to engage in herding such as issuing rating 
actions out of insecurity of having conflicting credit rating with some other rating agency. However, 
what all the herding rating actions must have in common are: First, they can never occur before the 
action that they are to imitate. Second, the lag compared to the leading rating action cannot be very 
long or the herding agency wouldn’t anymore benefit in issuing the herding rating action. These 
insights show that, irrespective of the exact reasons or ways to practice herding, the result is the same: 
Herding activity results in unproportional number of rating actions taking place soon after rating 
actions by other agency. The following Figure 7 illustrates the discussion presented above. 
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Figure 8 illustrates how the three factors [Continuous imperfections (1), Random imperfections (2), and 
Herding behaviour (3)] alter the place and shape of the probability function for rating action. It is 
insightful to understand that if there wouldn’t exists continuous imperfections there wouldn’t exist 
rational reason for herding behaviour, but the existence of continuous imperfections doesn’t necessarily 
result in herding activity between the agencies. So it is impossible to distinct these two factors’ effects. 
As it is impossible to search evidence exclusively from herding factor, I search evidence of the 
combined effect of factors one and three. The combined effect of these factors would harm the 
symmetry of the illustrated probability function.  
 
Inspired by the discussed rationale, I find out how many herding action observations, in which agency 
A lags agency B, there are for each lag day from 1 to 60. Vice versa, I determine the same number of 
herding rating action observations in which agency B lags agency A in 60 days. If the probability 
function for agency’s rating actions relative to other agency’s rating action is symmetrical, differences 
in observed numbers of herding rating actions between the agencies in any time window should not 
statistically differ from zero. The following mathematical representation describes the number series 
subject to my statistical tests in a given time window. 
 
Equation (5): Herding actions’ diff. in X days window = [(AB1)-(BA1)], [(AB2)-(BA2)],...,[(ABX)-(BAX)] 
 
In the representation the first letter in parenthesis indicates leading agency and the second letter lagging 
agency. The number behind the letters indicates lag day from which the number of observations are 
gathered. For example, if there would exist five observations in which agency B would lag agency A 
one day and respectively number of observations in which agency A would lag agency B would 
amount to seven the content of [(AB1)-(BA1)] would be replaced by figure minus two. 
 
Herding actions’ differences are subject to student’s t test and sign test. The tests are discussed already 
in CDS respond section in this chapter so the discussion of those tests is not repeated here. The purpose 
of these statistical tests is to find out whether the number series statistically differ from zero. If the tests 
show no indication that the number series would statistically differ from zero, I conclude that there is 
no evidence of combined effect of factors one and three. Thus there would not be any evidence of 
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herding behaviour either. However, if the numbers differ significantly from zero there remains 
possibility for herding behaviour.  
 
I will run these aforementioned statistical tests for different time windows in order to find out on which 
time window(s) the likelihood for herding behaviour is strongest. The maximum time window is 60 
days as I restricted herding rating action to occur in 60 days after the rating action it is supposed to 
imitate. The other time windows are: 30 days, 14 days, and 7 days. As herding behaviour is deemed to 
cause rating actions to follow more close the rating actions they are supposed to relate, I consider 
findings violating the hypothesis seven in shorter event windows (7 days and 14 days) stronger pro-
herding evidence compared to violating findings under the wider windows (30 days and 60 days).   
  
As stated previously, there prevail substantial differences between agencies’ frequencies to issue rating 
actions. Fitch seems to issue approximately 1/3 less credit rating actions than S&P and Moody’s. This 
fact causes that number of rating actions, for which Fitch can react is substantially higher than the 
number of rating actions by Fitch for which S&P and/or Moody’s can react. In the data description 
section, I determined the lazy ratios, which illustrate how many more times agency issues rating actions 
for which the other agency can react. For example, Fitch’s lazy ratio with S&P was found to equal 
0.66. Hence, in order to control results against deviating rating action frequencies between Fitch and 
S&P, I multiply all Fitch’s herding rating actions observations by a factor 0.66. The same logic I apply 
to  other  agency  pairs  as  well.  In  the  empirical  results  section  findings  are  reported  from  both  the  
controlled and uncontrolled samples. 
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6 Empirical results 
 
This  section  discusses  the  empirical  results  of  my  thesis.  First,  I  show  the  results  of  CDS  market  
reactions study, after which I present the pioneering findings of possible herding behaviour between the 
major credit rating agencies. In this section I test the hypotheses, listed in the introduction section, and 
find out if they are in line with my empirical results. 
6.1 CDS respond study 
 
This section presents my results of CDS market reactions around credit rating announcements by the 
major credit rating agencies. First, I show my CDS market reactions results for every rating type by 
each of the three agencies that had sufficient sample size and test whether the first hypothesis holds 
(see page 10). Along with this discussion, I also test the hypotheses three and four when the results 
allow (see pages 13 and 14). Then I analyse my results in order to find out if they support the second 
hypothesis testing the asymmetry between positive and negative announcements, which is found 
among previous studies. Finally, I present comparisons of rating announcements’ CDS market 
responses between the periods before and after the hit of the credit crisis. 
6.1.1 CDS market reactions by rating types 
 
The main results reported in this section are in line with the previous studies of the field. I find the 
strongest announcement window effect attached to negative view watchlist announcements.  T-test 
results show 1% significant market impact for every agency at the announcement window. The second 
strongest market impact is related to straight downgrades, which mean that the downgrade is not 
preceded by corresponding watchlisting. However, downgrade from the negative view watchlist does 
not seem to induce any effect on the market at all. On the contrary, announcement to cancel negative 
view watchlisting without the downgrade has market impact according to my findings. Cancelled 
negative view watchlist announcement by S&P has market impact on 5% level. Interestingly, that is the 
most influential positive rating announcement in my results. Furthermore, I find that the magnitude of 
market impact depends more on whether the rating announcement is preceded with the corresponding 
watchlist announcement than how many notches it moves the credit rating.  
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In the following presentation of results a careful reader spots that in every rating type the 
announcement effect in the [-1, 1] window shown on table might not match to the illustration of 
cumulative adjusted speard change in corresponding figure. This is because the data for figures is 
collected in intervals of every thirth day, which is obviously two wide window to capture the delicate 
effect in the [-1, 1] window around the rating announcement. 
 
Negative view watchlist announcement 
 
Results detailed in the following Table 6 reveal that negative view watchlist announcements by all 
three agencies have significant impact on the CDS market. In the announcement window [-1, 1] both t-
test and sign test reports market impact at 1% significance level for S&P and Moody’s. T-test also 
shows 1% significance for Fitch’s announcements, but sign test remains significant only at 5% level. 
These findings are well in line with the most recent CDS reactions study, Micu et al. (2005), but 
slightly contradict Norden and Weber (2004), as it did not find Fitch’s negative view watchlist 
announcement having significant market impact. In fact, Figure 9 illustrating the development of 
median cumulative abnormal spread change shows the widest change in the spreads around Fitch’s 
announcement. One plausible explanation for this might be the fact pointed out in the data description 
section that Fitch issues in proportion less negative watchlistings than straight downgrades compared to 
other major agencies giving more weight on its negative view watchlistings. However, due to the 
smaller sample size, S&P and Moody’s have slightly better statistical significance among their 
announcements. Furthermore, the jump in the spreads in Figure 9 from 7.07 bps to 24.11 bps occurs 
actually in [-6, 3] window, which also explains why the announcement effect in the [-1, 1] window 
remains not that significant. 
  
Out of the major rating agencies, Moody’s is the only one without findings suggesting significant 
market anticipation before its negative view watchlist announcement. CDS market seems to anticipate 
S&P’s negative view watchlistings significantly during the 30 days period before the announcement. 
Also Fitch’s announcements seem to have some market anticipation, but of less significance and over a 
longer period of time compared to S&P’s announcements. Micu et al. (2005) reported significant 
market anticipation for every agency, but my findings support market anticipation only for S&P and 
Fitch. Interestingly, S&P’s negative view watchlistings seem also to follow with downward sliding 
  
57
CDS spreads during [31, 60] and [61, 90] time windows after the announcement. The same effect is not 
discovered among Moody’s and Fitch’s announcements. Possible explanation for this finding may be 
that market continuously over react to S&P’s negative view watchlistings. Based on my findings of 
negative view announcements’ market reactions, the first hypothesis is rejected for S&P and Fitch 
because of the market anticipation and remains not rejected for Moody’s. The first hypothesis states 
that markets do not anticipate rating announcement, but react immediately as it occurs. 
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Single notch downgrade from negative view watchlist 
 
CDS market doesn’t react at all to single notch downgrades from negative view wachlist, based on my 
findings detailed in the following Table 7 and Figure 10. In the announcement window [-1, 1] spreads 
do not show any increase due to the announcement by S&P or Moody’s. Fitch’s single notch 
downgrades amounted only to nine, which is why they are omitted from the analysis. These findings 
are line with the rationale that the market has already reacted to negative view watchlisting and expects 
the downgrade to take place, which is the reason why the following downgrade conveys no new 
information. Also the anticipation particularly in the [-60, -30] window before S&P’s announcement is 
in line with the presented logic as it takes between 6 - 8 weeks (i.e. 42 - 56 days) for S&P to terminate 
its negative view watchlisting by either cancelling it or issuing the downgrade. Moody’s announcement 
has lesser of anticipation, but sign test in [-90, -60] window shows also 5% significant anticipation, 
while t-test remains insignificant. Based on these discussed findings not suggesting market impact the 
first hypothesis is rejected for both S&P and Moody’s concerning single notch downgrade from 
negative view watchlist. 
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Cancelled negative view watchlist announcement 
 
In line with the discussion in the previous section is the finding that out of the two possible ways to 
terminate negative view watchlisting, cancellation seems to induce more market impact than the actual 
downgrade as Table 8 and Figure 11 explain. S&P’s announcement to cancel negative view 
watchlisting has significance on 1% level according to sign test, and significance on 5% level 
according to t-test. Sign test shows market anticipation before S&P’s announcement in the [-30, -2] 
window at 1% significance level, while t-test shows no significance in the anticipation. Fitch’s 
announcement to cancel negative view watchlisting has no market impact, what so ever, within any 
period around the announcement. Moody’s number of observations in cancelling negative view 
watchlisting amounted only to nine, which is why it is excluded from the analysis in this section. 
 
Findings this far support the idea that the CDS market reacts already so intensely to S&P’s negative 
view watchlistings that the following downgrade is already priced on the spreads, which causes 
cancellation of the watchlisting to actually deliver new information to market as it means that the 
expected downgrade is not to take place. The reason why Fitch’s announcements to cancel negative 
view watchlisting have no market impact may relate to the fact that the majority of Fitch’s negative 
view watchlisting were taken back during the observation period. Fitch cancelled 19 out of its 32 
negative watchlistings suggesting that the cancellation of Fitch negative view watchlisting is not that 
big of a news for the market. Based on my findings, the first hypothesis is rejected for Fitch, because of 
the lack of announcement effect and for S&P, because the test results cannot rule out the possibility of 
market anticipation. 
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Straight single notch downgrade 
 
Straight single notch downgrade by S&P induces market impact on 5% level according to both t-test 
and sign test. However, it precedes with statistically significant market anticipation, which prevents 
non-rejection of the first hypothesis for S&P. Sign test reports market anticipation on 5% level and t-
test on 10% level in the window [-30, -2]. According to intuition, straight downgrades should be 
triggered by strong and unexpected market events, because the agency issuing it does not require time 
to consider the downgrade more precisely on the watchlist. Thus should straight downgrades not be 
preceded with any significant anticipation over long term, but as the agency needs to carry a formal 
credit review process, there likely exists CDS market reaction (anticipation) just before the 
announcement, which is exactly the case in my findings concerning S&P’s announcements. 
 
Fitch’s straight single notch downgrade has ambiguous market impact as sign test is unable to find any 
significance of market reactions in the [-1, 1] window, while t-test shows significance on 5% level. As 
a result of mixed market impact, I reject the first hypothesis for Fitch as well. On the contrary to S&P, 
which issues approximately half of its downgrades with and half without a corresponding watchlisting, 
Fitch issues merely all its single notch downgrades without the watchlisting. This rating action 
behaviour by Fitch is likely to dilute the market impact of its straight downgrades, which is in line with 
my empirical results as well. 
 
Based on the findings detailed in Table 9 and Figure 12 in comparison with the previously reported 
findings it is obvious that straight single notch downgrades have more market impact than single notch 
downgrades from watchlist. These findings allow me not to reject the fourth hypothesis regarding 
negative announcements. The fourth hypothesis states that CDS market reaction is stronger when rating 
change is not preceded with corresponding watchlist announcement. Because of the assumed 
asymmetry between market impacts concerning positive and negative announcements, the fourth 
hypothesis is tested separately among these groups. This finding shows that previous studies of rating 
announcements’ CDS market impact have suffered from the pooling of downgrades to the same 
category. Downgrades with the preceding watchlisting and without it are two very distinct 
announcement types. Straight single notch downgrades have a market impact close to the magnitude of 
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negative view watchlistings, while downgrades from the watchlist seem not to have market impact at 
all. Having these announcements analysed under same the category have led previous studies to 
exaggerate the impact of downgrades with the preceding watchlisting and underestimate the impact of 
downgrades without it. 
 
 
  
64
Double notch downgrade 
 
The findings detailed in Table 10 and Figure 13 contradicts the intuition, which would suggest a strong 
market reaction to be attached to double notch downgrades. Findings of market impact in the [-1, 1] 
window for S&P’s announcements are mixed, because t-test finds no significance, what so ever, even if 
t-test finds significance on 5% level. What comes to Fitch’s corresponding announcements, both the 
tests report insignificant market impact. Already, based on these results, I am able to reject the first 
hypothesis for both S&P and Fitch concerning double notch downgrades. The sharp jump in CDS 
spreads in Figure 13 related to S&P’s announcement takes place just after [-1, 1] window, which is the 
reason why either of the statistical tests don’t show any stronger significance figures. The adjusted 
median spread change increases from day three approximately by half to day six, after which it returns 
by day nine back to approximately same level it was in the day three. 
 
Furthermore, what there is interesting in my findings is that, both the tests report market anticipation on 
5% significance level for both the agencies, but for different time windows. The anticipation preceding 
S&P’s double notch downgrade takes place in the [-60, -31] window, while the anticipation before 
Fitch’s announcements occurs in the window [-30, -2]. For S&P, this phenomenon might derive from 
the fact that I had to pool together both the double notch downgrades with and without preceding 
watchlisting, because of small sample size. Thus the market anticipation for the double notch 
downgrades would in fact be the market reaction for the preceding negative view watchlisting. This 
explains the findings quite well as 14 out of 20 double notch downgrades by S&P, had preceding 
watchlisting in my sample. Furthermore, there was also found 5% significant market anticipation in the 
same [-60, -31] window around S&P’s single notch downgrades from negative view watchlist (see 
Table 7). What comes to Fitch’ announcements, the market anticipation is more likely to be true 
anticipation rather than reaction to previous watchlisting as only 5 out of 18 Fitch’s double notch 
downgrades had the preceding watchlisting and my findings in the Table 7 don’t show market 
anticipation before Fitch’s single notch downgrades from negative view watchlist. 
 
My findings offer dubious evidence concerning the third hypothesis stating that magnitude of CDS 
market reaction correlates to number of notches moved in rating change. The CDS market impact at the 
moment of double notch downgrade announcement obviously lacks in statistical significance behind 
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the straight single notch downgrades, but it is risky to compare these two groups of downgrades with 
each other as in total approximately half of my double notch downgrades were preceded with the 
corresponding watchlisting. When comparing double notch downgrades with single notch downgrades 
from negative view watchlist the double notch downgrades have more market impact. However this is 
also not an unproblematic comparison as the double notch downgrades also include rating 
announcements without the preceding watchlisting. Following the prudence principal, I conclude that I 
do not have enough evidence to support the third hypothesis. Based on my findings, it seems to matter 
more whether a rating change is preceded with corresponding watchlisting than how many notches the 
action moves the credit rating.  
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Positive view watchlist announcement 
 
On the contrary to negative view watchlist announcements, positive view watchlist announcements by 
S&P don’t induce any CDS market impact. Table 11 and Figure 14 shows that throughout the period [-
90, 90] there are no indications that positive view watchlistings would impact on the market any way. 
This finding is well in line with the previous studies, which have found asymmetry between market 
impacts of positive and negative announcements. Based on the absence of the market impact the first 
hypothesis is rejected for S&P concerning positive view watchlist announcement. 
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Single notch upgrade from positive view watchlist 
 
On the contrary to findings concerning downgrades from negative view watchlist, upgrades from 
positive view watchlist are likely to have some market impact. According to my findings, detailed in 
Table 12 and Figure 15, S&P’s single notch upgrades from corresponding watchlist don’t have market 
impact in the window [-1, 1]. However, t-test shows decreasing CDS spreads on 5% significance level 
for the windows [2, 30] and [31, 60]. Furthermore, sign test results support decreasing CDS spreads on 
10% significance level in the [31, 60] window. Based on the results in this and in the previous section it 
seems that the market does not yet deem positive view watchlistings as strong announcements, but 
upgrades from positive view watchlist ultimately leads to market reaction, even though not an 
immediate one. However, as the market impact is not immediate the first hypothesis has to be rejected 
for S&P concerning single notch upgrade from positive view watchlist. Furthermore, the lagged market 
reaction is only supported by t-test. 
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Straight single notch upgrade 
 
The CDS market seems to anticipate straight single notch upgrades by S&P surprisingly well. In the 
event window [-30, -2] t-test shows decreasing CDS spreads on 5% significance level and sign test 
supports declining CDS spreads even on 1% level. However, the announcement effect in the [-1, 1] 
window does not seem that strong for S&P. T-test doesn’t show any significance, but sign test reports 
declining CDS spreads on 5% level. Based on the market anticipation and absence of sufficient 
announcement impact, I reject the first hypothesis concerning S&P’s straight single notch upgrades. 
These findings are in line with the rationale that the companies to which upgrades relate tends to 
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inform investors about their improved credit quality to lower their cost of debt. Thus the role left for 
rating agencies’ upgrades would just be to verify the underlying event with their upgrade. 
 
Fitch’s straight single notch upgrades are not anticipated by the market and there is announcement 
effect in [-1, 1] window significant at 1% level according to t-test. However, because sign test does not 
show any significance, I have to reject the first hypothesis for Fitch’s as well. This finding showing 
such a strong and unanticipated market impact for Fitch’s announcement contradicts the logic by which 
I reasoned S&P’s findings in the previous paragraph. In fact, it seems that Fitch’s straight single notch 
upgrades have more market impact compared to its straight single notch downgrades. 
 
What comes to the fourth hypothesis in regards to positive rating actions, I must only rely on the 
findings of S&P’s announcements as other agencies did not have sufficient amount of data to facilitate 
the comparison between single notch upgrades from watchlist and straight single notch upgrades. The 
fourth hypothesis tests if the CDS market reaction is stronger when rating change is not preceded with 
corresponding watchlist announcement. Based on the findings not suggesting statistically significant 
market impact related to straight single notch upgrade by S&P, I have to reject the fourth hypothesis 
among positive announcements. 
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New rating announcement 
 
During the total observation period only Fitch’s new rating announcement observations were sufficient 
enough to be statistically analysed. Interestingly, CDS spreads seem to decline during the month before 
Fitch’s new rating announcement, but jump up just at the moment of initial rating release. The results 
also have statistical significance: t-test supports the findings at 5% level and sign test at 10% level. The 
findings could be explained by the logic that already awareness of upcoming rating release leads 
investors to trust more on company’s credit quality, although the initial rating on average seems to be a 
slight disappointment in the market. Furthermore, these findings are in line with the presumption that 
there is no clear positive or negative effect attached to new rating announcement. 
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6.1.2 Asymmetric spread adjustment 
 
My results support in general the findings reported in previous studies that the market reaction between 
positive and negative rating actions is asymmetric. My findings reveal that negative rating 
announcements have significant market impact in the [-1, 1] window among negative view 
watchlistings by every major agency and among straight single notch downgrades by S&P. Positive 
rating actions have significant market impact only among S&P’s cancelled negative view watchlistings. 
Next, I present rating announcement impact comparisons between positive and negative actions, based 
on the empirical results shown in the previous section. Due to insufficient amount of Moody’s positive 
rating actions, the following paragraphs discusses only about S&P’s and Fitch’s announcements. 
  
Comparison between positive and negative view watchlist announcement is only possible for S&P, 
because of limitations in the other agencies’ positive rating action samples. Table 6 explains that the 
market reacts to S&P’s negative view wathclisting with 1% significance according to both t-test and 
sign test. However, there is no statistically significant changes in the spreads in any period around 
positive view watchlisting by S&P (see Table 11). This finding is a strong evidence for the second 
hypothesis suggesting asymmetry between positive and negative rating actions. 
  
S&P and Fitch both have sufficient amount of data for announcement impact comparisons between 
straight single notch downgrades and upgrades. Findings around S&P’s announcements, further on, 
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support the second hypothesis. T-test finds at 1% significance level S&P’s straight single notch 
downgrades having market impact, whereas the test finds no significance among S&P’s straight single 
notch upgrades. Sign test, however, reports significant market impact at 5 % level for both the rating 
types. 
  
Unexpectedly comparison between Fitch’s straight single notch upgrades and downgrades offer 
contradicting evidence against the second hypothesis. T-test shows statistically significant market 
impact at 5% level for straight single notch downgrades, but for straight single notch upgrades it shows 
significance at 1% level. Sign test is not able to find any significance among neither of the 
announcements, which alleviates the power of this contradictory piece of evidence against the second 
hypothesis. 
 
Single notch upgrade and downgrade from corresponding watchlists by S&P both induce no 
statistically  significant  market  impact  at  the  moment  of  the  announcement.  However,  there  is  
asymmetry between levels of anticipation and lagged market impact according to t-test results. The 
single notch downgrades from watchlist have anticipation in the [-60, -31] and [-30, -2] windows 
whereas anticipation is absent in the case of corresponding upgrades. Among the upgrades from 
positive view watchlist there is a significant lagged market impact within the windows [2, 30] and [31, 
60], whereas the lagged market impact is absent among the downgrades from negative view watchlist.   
 
Based on my findings, I am not able to state that among every rating type in every agency negative 
rating action would weight more than the corresponding positive one, especially because of the 
empirical findings concerning Fitch’s straight single notch upgrades and S&P’s cancelled negative 
view watchlistings. However, in general my findings reveal that without a doubt the market puts more 
weight on negative announcements compared to positive ones. Hence, I am able to retain the second 
hypothesis not-rejected. The second hypothesis states that CDS market reaction is stronger among 
negative rating announcements compared to positive ones. 
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6.1.3 Impact of the credit crisis 
 
My findings reveal that there are three major components of differences in the CDS market reactions 
around rating actions between the periods before and after the hit of the crisis. First, volatility in CDS 
spreads around rating announcements has increased substantially for every major agency. Second, CDS 
market anticipation for rating actions has decreased significantly also for every agency. Third, the 
announcement effect in the [-1, 1] window around the rating announcement has become stronger for 
Moody’s and Fitch, while it has weakened for S&P. According these findings, presented also in the 
following Tables 15–17 and Figures 18–20, I am able to reject my fifth hypothesis stating that the 
credit crisis has not influenced on credit rating actions’ CDS market reactions. 
 
I decide to analyse the differences in the CDS market reactions only among every agency’s rating type 
that contains the most observations. These announcement types are the following: Negative view 
watchlist announcements for S&P and Moody’s and straight single notch downgrade for Fitch. If I 
were not proceeding as explained, I would end up dealing with insufficient sample sizes in the 
subsamples. For example, the number of Fitch’s negative view watchlist announcements totals to 32, 
which is inadequate amount to be divided for the subsamples before and after the crisis.     
 
Volatility in CDS spreads around rating actions has substantially increased by the introduction of the 
crisis. The results detailed in Tables 15–17 show that volatility in the adjusted spread changes has 
increased in every analysed time window for every major agency. The increased market wide volatility 
was shown already in Figure 7. However, market wide turbulences shouldn’t affect the analysis in this 
section directly. This is because all the spread changes reported in the findings are controlled against 
market wide events by subtracting the corresponding spread change in the overall spread index as 
explained in the methodology section.  
 
In line with the discussion of increased volatility is the fact that the level of CDS market anticipation 
for rating announcements has decreased after the hit of the crisis. Market anticipation for Moody’s 
rating announcements has ceased completely. Before the crisis CDS market seems to have anticipated 
Moody’s negative view watchlist announcements during the [-60, -31] window at 5% significance level 
according to both tests, but after the crisis there is no indications of anticipation left anymore. 
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Respectively, the level of market anticipation for S&P’s rating actions has also decreased substantially 
due the crisis. The change between the two periods is overwhelming, because during the period before 
the crisis the findings report market anticipation at 1% significance level in the [-30, -2] window 
according to both t-test and sign test. After the crisis the tests only report market anticipation at 5% 
level according to t-test in the [-30, -2] window. The change in market anticipation related to Fitch’s 
rating announcements is not that clear as the tests don’t report substantial evidence of market 
anticipation even for the period before the crisis. 
 
Announcement effects in the [-1, 1] window have also changed due the crisis. Moody’s and Fitch’s 
announcements’ market impacts have become stronger according to both tests. However, S&P’s rating 
announcements’ impact on the CDS market has declined according to both tests. Sign test does not 
show any significant market impact related to S&P’s announcements after the crisis anymore. Also t-
test has fallen in significance from 1% level to 5% level regarding S&P’s announcements. 
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6.2 Herding study 
 
In this section I first present my herding behaviour findings on agency pair level concerning hypotheses 
six and seven. Then I sum up my major herding study results and assess whether the eighth hypotheses 
is in line with my findings.  
 
6.2.1 Agency pair level herding findings 
 
This section discusses herding study results in respect to hypotheses six and seven for every agency 
pair separately. Agency pairs are the following: S&P and Moody’s, S&P and Fitch, Moody’s and Fitch. 
Breakdown of herding study results is presented in Table 18. The table describes test results regarding 
the seventh hypothesis in four different time windows. The seventh hypothesis states that credit rating 
agencies have similar likelihoods to lead and lag each others. The table shows, on which significance 
level, the agency first expressed in agency pair heading has statistically significant amount more 
herding rating actions than the other agency within the agency pair. The logic is to determine 
differences in numbers of herding rating action observations for each lag day and then test whether the 
series of herding rating action differences from lag day one up to lag day 7, 14, 30, and/or 60 
significantly differs from zero. I report my results for both original and controlled samples for every 
agency pair. In controlled samples, herding rating action observations of less frequently actions issuing 
agency are multiplied by its lazy ratio. The logic of lazy ratio controlling is to abolish the bias that 
accrues from the fact that if an agency issues more actions than the other, then the other agency has 
higher chance that whenever it issues rating action there is already rating action by the other agency for 
which it can be seen responsive. 
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S&P and Moody’s 
 
Figure 21 plots the herding action observations between S&P and Moody’s. Left part of the figure [-60, 
0] illustrates number of observations where Moody’s leads and S&P lags. Respectively, right part of 
the figure [0, 60] describes number of observations where S&P leads and Moody’s lags. Even with bare 
eye one perceives that it is approximately as likely for S&P to lead same number of days as it is to lag, 
which has to be identical for the situation that Moody’s is also approximately as likely to lead what it is 
to lag some number of days. Figure 22 illustrates the differences in herding rating action observations, 
which are very small (all within the range +/-3 observations) and seemingly randomly distributed for 
positive and negative ones. There are very little differences between Figures 22 and 23 as the lazy ratio 
by which Moody’s herding rating action observations are adjusted is very close to one (0.96). 
 
My statistical test results (t-test and sign test) support the first impression of the symmetry in the 
herding rating action distribution. Table 18 shows that for no event window cumulated herding rating 
action observations’ differences that would significantly differ from zero. As the lazy ratio is close to 
one the results are approximately same for both controlled and uncontrolled samples. My statistical test 
results are consistent with the seventh hypothesis for the agency pair S&P and Moody’s. Therefore, I 
can state that S&P and Moody’s lead and lag each others with similar likelihoods. The non-rejection of 
hypothesis seven suggests absence of herding behaviour between the agencies. However, there is still a 
small chance that the agencies imitate each other equally much, because my test structure compares 
agencies’ herding action observations and if the herding behaviour would be of the same intensity and 
timely patterns would also match, then the possible herding behaviour would remain undiscovered. 
 
Figure 21 alleviates these concerns as it shows that there is far greater proportion of rating actions 
occurring simultaneously compared to observations with some number of days lag between them. In 
my sample, there amounted 40 paired rating action observations, in which lag is zero meaning that S&P 
and Moody’s have in these situations issued their rating actions exactly at the same day. Next likely, I 
find that S&P is to lag Moody’s with one day (10 observations) and third likely is Moody’s to lag S&P 
correspondingly with just one day (7 observations). Every other combination of paired rating actions 
contains four or less observations. These findings are well in line with my sixth hypothesis. The sixth 
hypothesis argues that credit rating agencies issue their rating actions, triggered by the same event, on a 
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same day. This is indeed the true state of affairs based on my findings. However, it can only be 
assumed that the paired rating actions are triggered by the same event, as there is no meaningful way to 
find out it in practice. Based on my empirical findings, which are in line with hypothesis six and seven, 
I can state that there are no indications that either of the agencies, S&P or Moody’s, would engage in 
herding behaviour and imitate each other. 
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S&P and Fitch 
 
Figure 24 illustrates herding rating action observation distribution for agency pair S&P and Fitch. The 
left part of the figure [-60, 0] shows herding rating action observations where S&P lags Fitch, while the 
right part [0, 60] plots numbers of observations where Fitch lags S&P. On the contrary to agency pair 
S&P and Moody’s, one cannot rely as much on symmetry of the distribution. For example, 19 
observations where Fitch lags S&P with one day clearly outweigh the five observations in the opposite 
case where S&P lags Fitch with the corresponding one day.  
 
My statistical test results confirm the lack of symmetry in the distribution illustrated in Figure 24. 
Table 6 explains that for uncontrolled sample both the t-test and sign test indicates for every time 
window herding action observations by Fitch to outweigh number of S&P’s herding observations 
minimum on 5% significance level. After controlling against the general frequency of credit rating 
activity Fitch is still found to have on 5 % significance level more herding rating actions than S&P in 
the 14 days window. These findings contradict the hypothesis seven. The rejection of hypothesis seven 
for agency pair S&P and Fitch may originate either from continuous imperfections or herding 
behaviour and continuous imperfections combined. This finding leaves the chance of herding 
behaviour open for Fitch’s agency, where as it seems impossible that S&P would imitate Fitch’s rating 
actions. The fact that I find Fitch issuing relatively more herding rating actions particularly in a short 
time window makes the finding interesting regarding possible herding behaviour, because the link 
between leading and lagging rating action is obviously the stronger the shorter lag is there between 
them.  
 
Nevertheless the rejection of the seventh hypothesis, agency pair S&P and Fitch still passes the acid 
test for herding behaviour as simultaneous rating actions are the most popular ones among the paired 
rating actions. Number of simultaneous rating actions by S&P and Fitch totals to 49, which is far more 
than in the second popular case where Fitch lags one day S&P with observations totalling to 19, as 
explained previously. Therefore, I am able to leave the sixth hypothesis not rejected for agency pair 
S&P and Fitch. 
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Moody’s and Fitch 
 
Figure 27 describes herding rating action observation distribution for agency pair Moody’s and Fitch. 
The left part plots the observations, in which Moody’s lags Fitch and the right part observations, in 
which Fitch lags Moody’s. The total number of herding rating action observations for agency pair 
Moody’s and Fitch amounted to much less than for the other two agency pairs simply because they rate 
fewer  companies  simultaneously.  In  my  sample  there  were  only  85  companies,  which  were  
simultaneously rated by Moody’s and Fitch, while S&P and Moody’s rated simultaneously 110 
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companied and S&P and Fitch 219 companies (see Appendix 2). Apparently, because of smaller 
sample size the results are somewhat mixed concerning this agency pair. 
 
Table 6 reports statistical test results of herding behaviour between Moody’s and Fitch revealing that in 
uncontrolled sample Fitch would have on 10 percent significance level more herding actions than 
Moody’s in the 14 days window. This finding is in line with the herding behaviour results of agency 
pair S&P and Fitch. However, after controlling results against general rating action frequency the 
finding seems not to hold anymore. Moreover, in the controlled sample, the setting turns upside down 
and in 30 and 60 days windows Moody’s seems to have more herding rating action observations than 
Fitch on 10% significance level. Given the mixed nature of findings, hypothesis seven for agency pair 
Moody’s and Fitch remains unanswered. However, hypothesis six holds within this agency pair as well. 
Number of simultaneous rating actions clearly outweighs any other combination of paired rating 
actions. There amounted 16 simultaneous rating actions for Moody’s and Fitch during the total 
observation period, while the second popular case was that Fitch lags Moody’s with one day containing 
seven observations. 
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6.2.2 General level herding findings 
 
On general level, my study doesn’t find evidence that there would prevail herding behaviour between 
the major credit rating agencies. Panel D in Table 5 shows that on average only 16.26% of rating 
actions that could have triggered herding rating action, actually triggered one. This finding 
substantially alleviates concerns of herding behaviour plaguing the major agencies. Furthermore, the 
deviation in this proportion of observed herding rating actions as percentage of their theoretical 
maximums’ is very moderate across the agency pairs. For every agency pair the figure lies within the 
range 12.96% - 18.84%.  
 
In fact, this finding raises some concerns why the major rating agencies don’t react to market events in 
a more coherent manner. At least partially this concern is explained by the fact that these herding rating 
action observations don’t represent the entire sample of paired rating action observation as they don’t 
include observations of simultaneous rating actions. Taking simultaneous rating actions account as 
well, I find that in agency pair S&P and Moody’s, an arbitrary rating announcement occurs with 
22.44% likelihood within the [-60, 60] day window around the other agency’s rating action to the same 
direction credit quality wise. Corresponding figures for the other agency pairs are: 20.55% and 17.17% 
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for agency pairs S&P and Fitch, and Moody’s and Fitch, respectively3. Still the figures don’t seem very 
high. The finding that such a low rate of rating actions actually occurs close to rating actions by other 
agency is rather unexpected. Based on my results it seems that, on general level, the trouble with the 
major credit rating agencies would be the lack of adequate correlation in credit rating announcements 
rather than the herding behaviour.  
 
However, if omitting the results explained previous paragraph, the findings presented in the section 
6.2.1 supporting the comprehension that Fitch would be the most inclined agency to engage in herding 
behaviour are in line with my eighth hypothesis. The eighth hypothesis states that of the three major 
credit rating agencies Fitch is most likely to engage in herding behaviour. The reasons for such 
assumption are the findings from previous herding studies stating that attributes such as age, size and 
frequency of announcements are irreversibly correlated with likelihood to imitate. Fitch is the youngest 
of the major agencies. It is less than half of the size of S&P and a slightly bigger than half of the size of 
Moody’s measured by rating operations’ revenues. Furthermore, it issues on average 1/3 less rating 
actions than S&P and Moody’s. However, it needs to be acknowledged that the age factor doesn’t 
likely matter much in my herding study setting as the age differences between the agencies are not 
significant and the agencies are all relatively old. Most probably only the differences in size and 
relative frequency in issuing rating actions explain alone the finding that Fitch is the most inclined to 
herding behaviour.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
3 Figures are determined by the following formulas: 
           S&P and Moody’s:   (40+60+75)  / (382+398)*100% =  22.44% 
           S&P and Fitch:         (49+85+142) / (811+532)*100% =  20.55% 
            Moody’s and Fitch:  (16+31+39)   / (200+301)*100% =  17.17% 
  The content of the first parentheses includes simultaneous rating actions and herding rating actions by both agencies. 
   The content of the second parentheses includes theoretical maximums of herding rating actions for both agencies. 
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7 Summary and conclusions 
7.1 Summary 
 
This thesis studies major credit rating agencies’ impact on CDS market and the possibility that the 
credit rating agencies might imitate each other’s credit rating actions. The study offers unique outlook 
to development of credit rating agencies’ role during the recent credit crisis and first specific findings 
how different types of credit rating announcements impact the market. Furthermore, this thesis is first 
study to tackle possible herding behaviour between the major credit agencies. The data were retrieved 
from Bloomberg’s database and covers the period from January 1, 2000 to June 4, 2009. Data consists 
of issuer-specific credit rating actions for S&P 500 index companies by Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s 
and Fitch and the corresponding CDS spread data for five-year contracts. The CDS respond study 
applies traditional event study methodology used in previous researches in the field, but the 
methodological framework presented in the herding study is invented by author for the purposes of this 
study. In the herding study the basic logic is to analyse differences in observations of rating actions that 
closely follow rating actions by other agencies to same direction credit quality wise. 
 
According to my findings credit rating actions seem have an impact on CDS market, but in almost all 
cases where the announcement effect is significant the level of preceding CDS market anticipation is 
significant as well. Only Moody’s negative view watchlistings over the whole observation period offers 
a study book example how markets should react with high significance at the moment of announcement 
and without significant anticipation or even afterward slide to any direction after the announcement. 
S&P’s announcements’ impact the market, but in every situation where the announcement impact is 
significant the market anticipation is significant also. Fitch’s announcements’ impact on the CDS 
market are of less significance during the whole observation period, but the comparison between 
periods before and after the hit of the credit crisis shows that Fitch’s role in the market has strengthened 
during the recent years. Also Moody’s role has strengthened, but S&P’s role seems to have impaired 
due the credit crisis.  
 
My findings show that credit rating announcements have market impact particularly when 
announcements signal impaired credit quality. Positive rating actions in general have less of a market 
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impact, which means that there is asymmetry in CDS market reactions regarding positive and negative 
rating announcement. Previous studies of the field have encountered the same phenomenon and the 
probable reason for this is companies’ tendency to inform the market particularly of their improved 
creditworthiness to have their costs of financing to decrease. Furthermore, I find that among negative 
announcements it matters more whether a downgrade is preceded with corresponding watchlist 
announcement than how many notches the downgrade actually moves the credit rating. Also, I show 
that the reason why previous studies have failed to find more significance in the market impact among 
downgrades derives from the pooling of downgrades with preceding watchlist announcement and 
without it to same group. When analysed as different rating action types, I find that straight single 
notch downgrades have market impact, whereas single notch downgrades from negative view watchlist 
have not market impact at all.  
  
My herding study findings offer pioneering insight on how rating actions by the agencies relate to each 
other or not. First, I find that there is very low likelihood that S&P and Moody’s would imitate each 
others’ rating actions when reviewing same companies. Second, I find that Fitch issues rating actions 
that follow S&P’s rating actions in two weeks on 5% significance level more than vice versa even after 
controlling against discrepancies in overall credit rating activity between the agencies. This finding 
may be explained by slower credit review process or the slower credit review process and herding 
behaviour together, but it is impossible to say any more about the cause. Findings from relations 
between Moody’s and Fitch remain very much unknown as the sample of simultaneously rated 
companies is rather small, which causes somewhat mixed results. The findings that support Fitch’s 
tendency in herding behaviour more than S&P’s or Moody’s are in line with previous herding studies 
that have found factors such as age, size, and frequency of revisions to be irreversibly correlated with 
tendency to imitate. Fitch is the youngest and smallest of the agencies and it issues proportionally less 
rating actions than the two other agencies. In general level, I find that agencies’ credit rating 
announcements don’t occur very closely with each other. Within every agency pair the likelihood that 
rating action occurs within the [-60, 60] days window around the rating action by the other agency is 
approximately 20%. This finding substantially alleviates the concerns of herding behaviour between 
the agencies, but on the same time raises some new concerns why the rating agencies do not react to 
market events in a more similar manner. 
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7.2 Conclusions  
 
According to my findings, credit rating announcements’ that have impact on CDS market are usually 
preceded with statistically significant market anticipation. This finding doesn’t mean that credit rating 
announcements wouldn’t matter. Credit rating agencies need to carry their formal credit review 
processes through before release of rating announcement as they try to avoid unnecessary volatility in 
their credit ratings. Investors in the CDS market can instead react more quickly to market events, which 
is the reason why they usually seem to anticipate rating announcements. As far as credit rating 
announcements have market impact there is a role for credit rating agencies to serve, despite the market 
anticipation. Probably, without credit rating agencies the CDS market would develop to a more volatile 
form, as there would not exist light houses that would guide investors’ crusade through market 
turbulences. This argument is furthermore supported by the finding that in general rating 
announcements’ market impact has slightly strengthened due to the credit crisis. What comes to the 
discussion of credit rating agencies’ quasi-official role, my findings don’t highlight any reason why it 
should be cancelled. 
 
Perhaps the most interesting finding in this study is that only every fifth rating announcement takes 
place close to rating announcement by other agency when two agencies simultaneously rate a same 
company. This finding suggests that at least in the aggregate level herding behaviour is not damaging 
the agencies’ reputation. Even if it is good for the agencies that they do not show tendency to imitate 
each other, the finding raises other concerns about the reasons why major agencies so differently seem 
to interpret and react to market events. One plausible reason to explain the finding would be agencies’ 
divergent  appetites  on  how  to  communicate  with  the  market.  For  example,  Fitch  seems  to  prefer  
straight rating changes more than watchlist announcements as a way to interact with the market. On the 
contrary, Moody’s seldom issues any downgrade or upgrade without the preceding watchlist 
announcement. S&P is somewhere in between of these two extremes. However, this explanation is not 
enough to explain the whole phenomenon that must have also other reasons behind. 
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7.3 Topics for further research 
 
This study gives a plenty of motivation for further research. It would be interesting to tackle the 
comparison of herding behaviour before and after the hit of the credit crisis. Lack of sufficient amount 
of observations prevents me to show the comparison in this paper. The aim could be to find out 
whether the strengthened role of Fitch’s agency, after the hit of the credit crisis, would also show in 
herding findings as well. The strengthened role would mean less rating actions proportionally following 
rating actions by other agencies and more rating actions leading rating actions of others. Also, further 
studies about credit rating agencies’ herding behaviour could come up with some novel methodological 
innovations. In this pioneering herding study, I present straightforward framework that further studies 
are welcomed to elaborate, as they will, to find more nuances around the phenomenon. 
  
What comes to CDS respond study, further research could extend the number of analysed agencies. 
Currently there are ten NRSROs (see Table 2), so it would be interesting to investigate whether the 
smaller agencies would have market impact as well. Alternatively, the focus could be in studying the 
agency problems with credit rating agencies by comparing rating action behaviour between Egan-Jones 
rating agency and some other NRSRO of similar size and portfolio of reviewed entities. Egan-Jones 
collects its revenues directly from investors rather than rated companies like all other NRSROs do. 
 
Furthermore, it would be interesting to find out whether diverging credit ratings by different rating 
agencies would affect the volatility of company’s CDS spread. It can be reasoned that the CDS market 
should show more nervousness when two credit rating agencies possess slightly contradicting views 
about company’s creditworthiness. Finally, my thesis gives a good motivation for further studies to 
investigate whether the leading rating actions among paired rating actions by two agencies have more 
market impact than the lagging ones. That research topic would have been the next logical step to 
extent this study, but in order keep my thesis focussed, I chose to leave the subject for further 
researches to excavate. 
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